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PROMISES AND PERILS OF NEW GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE: A CASE OF THE G20 
 
 






In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a new global governance 
structure emerged.  During and subsequent to the crisis, the G20 arose as a 
coordinating executive among international governance institutions.  It set 
policy agendas, prioritized initiatives and, working through the Financial 
Stability Board, drew other governance institutions and networks such as 
the International Monetary Fund, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 
the World Trade Organization, the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
to set standards, monitor enforcement and compliance, and aid recovery.  
Its authority cross-cuts regimes and creates collaborative linkages between 
economic law and social issues such as food security and the environment. 
Its leadership role, born out of exigency, now continues to evolve as part of 
the new international economic law order.   
 
The G20’s coordination of institutions and networks exemplifies a new 
form of global governance.  Network coordination offers an opportunity to 
confront complex problems with a needed comprehensive approach.  The 
institutions and networks engage in an ongoing dialectical process that 
propels standard setters towards convergence on a number of fronts.  The 
actors in this process employ a variety of tools to forge consensus and the 
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G20 leverages this consensus-creating process to achieve its goals.  
Unpacking these tools can help us tackle intricate questions that arise from 
this new structure.  In particular, we focus on concerns of effectiveness and 
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 An unprecedented challenge calls for an unprecedented response.  
The exigency of the financial crisis in 2008, which precipitated the worst 
global recession since the Great Depression in the 1920s, forced major 
global economies to develop a new type of collective regulatory response, 
which was largely unfathomable under traditional international cooperation 
mechanisms, such as diplomacy or treaty-making.  The leaders of twenty 
major economies – the G20 Leaders– promptly assumed the unprecedented 
role of an executive coordinator over pre-existing trans-governmental 
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regulatory networks (TRNs).1  In doing so, the G20 harnessed these sector-
specific TRNs2 comprised of professional regulatory agencies from 
different economies and set itself at the helm as an executive coordinator.  It 
promised the spontaneity and efficacy necessary to respond to the financial 
crisis.  This article aims to scrutinize this phenomenon of coordinated 
networks that remains largely unaddressed.   
 One of the greatest challenges globalization has brought to 
international law is that it has irreversibly altered the traditional notion of 
time and space in which we used to grapple with international law.3  The 
end of the Cold War and the spectacular advancement of technologies have 
molded a multi-faceted phenomenon of globalization: integration, 
interdependence, spontaneity, and synchrony.  In an unprecedented pace, 
more goods, more services, more people and more money circulate all over 
the world.4  Nevertheless, the global financial crisis in 2008 has left a 
sobering lesson that globalization remains a mixed blessing.  A globalized 
financial and trade system has forced national economies to share not only 
prosperity but also risks.  This dark side of globalization tends to cast 
daunting challenges to regulators – both domestic and international.5  First, 
effects of domestic regulations may become limited as domestic systems 
become highly sensitive to external forces.  Second, as is seen in the climate 
change debate, certain regulatory problems are inter-national per se.  
                                                 
1 Cf. Andrew F. Cooper, The G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee and/or a 
Contested ‘Steering Committee’ for the World, 86 INT’L AFF. 741 (2010) (characterizing 
the G20 as a “steering committee” or a “crisis committee” to deliver specific regulatory 
deliverables).    
2 See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (presenting 
one of the most comprehensive narratives on nascent government networks and their norm-
generating effects); David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 576 (2008) [hereinafter Zaring, Rulemaking and 
Adjudication] (arguing that “networks are the rulemakers of international administrative 
law.”). 
3 See e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity 
in International Relations, 47 INT. ORG. 139, 172 (1993) (observing the emergence of a 
“decentered yet integrated space-of-flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside 
the spaces-of-places that we call national economies”). 
4 Philip H. Gordon, Europe's Cautious Globalization, in 88 CONTEMP. STUD. IN ECON. 
& FIN. ANALYSIS 3 (Janet Laible et al. eds., 2006) (“[C]learly the degree, intensity, speed, 
volume, and geographic reach of economic globalization today far exceed anything that has 
come before.”); Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 276 (2002). (“[I]nformation and communications technology 
has emerged as a dominant force in the global system of production, while trade in goods, 
services, and financial instruments are more prevalent than any time in history.”). 
5 Slaughter characterizes the dilemma of needing more government yet fearing it as a 
“globalization paradox.” SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 8. 
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Domestic regulatory efforts alone are insufficient to address such problems.  
Third, international regulations, if any, may not come as quickly as the 
urgency would demand.   
 At the inception and throughout the 2008 financial crisis, society 
saw national governments struggle to muster stimulus packages, fight off 
protectionism, and save at-risk entities.  Notably, society also saw an 
international effort to facilitate these national efforts.  The G20 Leaders 
initiated this international effort and managed to save 21 million jobs in 
2009 and 2010.6  Ironically, however, this unprecedented success of global 
policy coordination led the public to perceive the G20 from a rather 
superficial, that is to say mainly “political,” standpoint.  In other words, the 
public remains largely uninformed of the behind-the-scene intense 
regulatory interactions among professional regulatory agencies at a micro-
operational level.  The bottom line is that G20 and the resources that it 
brought to bear did not spring out of nothing; they were in fact an outcome 
of decades-long policy networks between/among like-minded government 
officials communicating inside and outside of relevant international 
organizations.  Without the unique density and frequency of their 
interactions in those critical issue areas (such as international finance and 
securities), the G20 could not have proved so successful: it would have 
probably been yet another pompous initiative delivering no practical 
impacts.  At the same time, the G20’s coordination of these TRNs to 
confront the crisis clearly revealed a whole far greater than the sum of its 
parts.   
 Admittedly, its success needs to be examined rigorously.  Empirical 
confirmations are still limited and any attempt to quantify these successes 
may suffer a selection bias.  Nonetheless, the coordinated TRN 
phenomenon is not a mere anecdote: it is a new trend which challenges our 
conventional understanding of global governance.  We must probe closely 
the new TRN phenomenon, and in particular the coordination of networks, 
to verify if it brings truly beneficial changes and if so at what costs.  And 
the mere fact that a TRN is successful in creating standards does not 
necessarily mean that it was as successful as it could have been.  By 
definition, focusing on standards that were developed will not address those 
instances where the TRN sought to, or should have sought to, develop 
standards but failed.  
 In this regard, we propose to examine the work of the web of TRNs 
involved in the G20’s efforts to steer through the financial crisis by 
dissecting: (i) the G20’s coordination through the use of regulatory 
                                                 
6 G20 Saves 21 Mln Jobs with Crisis Measures—UN, REUTERS, Apr. 19, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/19/financial-jobs-idUSLDE63I24Q20100419. 
PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR 
9-Aug-11] NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 5 
 
blueprints or frameworks; (ii) the TRNs means by which they arrive at 
points of decisions (their dynamics); and (iii) the decisions they reach (end 
products).  Much has already been written about TRNs,7 but one piece that 
has been missing is how the TRNs actually do their work, in particular 
under a political coordinative mechanism, such as the G20.   
Additionally, we propose to identify taxonomy of various moves 
(tools) made within TRNs that we call the “intra-network dynamics.”  We 
make no judgment about the value of any particular tool, although readers 
may quickly realize that some tools are more palatable than others when 
one thinks about TRNs as a form of global governance.  While these social 
tools have already been extant in each network, it was the rise of the G20 
which awakened their genuine regulatory potential in an unprecedented 
endeavor to deliver desperate regulatory effects to avert the financial crisis. 
We also consider the end products of these TRNs and identify their 
characteristics as well as their utility.  Again, we do not make any value 
judgment about any particular end product.  Instead, we hope that by 
revealing and deconstructing the G20’s coordination, the intra-network 
dynamics, and end products we can offer an analytical lens through which 
we better understand this emerging paradigm of global governance.  In our 
view, this lens will reveal complex questions concerning efficacy and 
legitimacy.  
Our thesis on the G20 as a new paradigm of global governance 
unfolds in the following sequence.  Part I attempts to render a working 
definition of a TRN.  After providing an intellectual pedigree and 
theoretical underpinnings behind the government network theory, the Part 
highlights the TRN’s various characteristics, such as the expert, informal, 
and incremental nature of participants’ dialogue and eventual norm-
generating operations.  Part II offers a theory of network coordination by 
explaining the use of frameworks or blueprints that take advantage of pre-
existing network dynamics resulting in specific end products or regulatory 
prototypes.  Part III applies the theoretical construction of coordinated 
TRNs to the case of the G20.  This case study offers both empirical 
confirmations for and mismatches with the TRN model.  Part IV evaluates 
the coordinated TRN model in accordance with two major criteria: efficacy 
and legitimacy.  
Finally, a caveat of this article is in order.  Due to its inevitable 
political nature as a global executive coordinator, the G20 tends to draw 
                                                 
7 Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 
YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 114 (2009) (“In recent years, scholars of global governance have 
devoted substantial attention to the promise and perils of. . .regulatory networks (TRNs).”). 
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various critics on its performance.8  In particular it has been faulted for 
being an “ineffective talk shop.”9  Some question whether the G20 Leaders 
Summit will have any influence once the crisis subsides.10  These may be 
aggravated by heightened expectations given its initial successes.11  Yet our 
main focus in this article is more of uncelebrated, workmanlike aspects of 
the G20 operation.  We aim to demonstrate, without any ideological bias, 
the G20’s internal, microscopic operational dynamics, as well as certain 
conditions under which such operations tend to work best. 
 
 
I. AN EMERGING GOVERNANCE MODEL: TRANS-GOVERNMENTAL 
REGULATORY NETWORKS (TRNS) 
  
 The recent prominence of the G20 has demonstrated a new 
possibility in tackling those challenges brought by globalization.  TRNs 
offer a flexible and pragmatic alternative to the treaty process. The TRN 
process is dialogical, norm-generating, and incremental.    
 TRNs represent a relatively recent, but increasingly prevalent, center 
of international law making.  Traditionally international rules were 
negotiated and concluded by a formal treaty-making process. However, 
barring some exceptions, such as the EU, most international law-making 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Peter Apps, Eurasia Chief Sees Leaderless "G-zero" World, REUTERS, Jan. 
5, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/05/us-eurasia-interview-
idUSTRE70422220110105. 
9 Christopher Malcolm, And Then There was One—An Overview of the Fifth Summit of 
the Americas, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 11, 16 (2010) (“[T]here were still many others, 
however, that were skeptical and had expected that it would be no more than a talk shop”);  
It Cuts Both Ways, Uncles Sam, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-10-19/news/27626561_1_global-
imbalances-global-reserve-currency-numero-uno (“G20, a group that is mostly seen as a 
toothless body, a talk shop. .  
10 TOWARD THE CONSOLIDATION OF G20 SUMMITS: FROM CRISIS COMMITTEE TO 
GLOBAL STEERING COMMITTEE 2 (Colin I. Bradford & Wonhyuk Lim, eds., The Brookings 
Institute Press 2011) (“There is great concern, expressed by Il SaKong. . .the G20 may fade 
away as a significant forum for global leadership as the global financial crisis subsides and 
the current focus on financial and macro- economic issues increasingly shifts to technical 
matters unsuitable for discussion at the leadership level. . . .”). 
11 See, e.g., Gabriele Steinhauser & Greg Keller, Fuzzy Compromise Threatens 
Relevance of G-20, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 19, 2011, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12942693.  High expectations on the role of 
G20 seem to have already formed among global trade investors.  In the most recent 
incidence of global market volatility, they immediately turned to G20 for a prompt 
collective response.  See Se Young Lee, G20 Ministers Hold Call, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 
2011; G20 Deputies to Hold Crisis Call on Saturday: Brazil, REUTERS, Aug. 6, 2011. 
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now occurs in a highly de-centralized structure, which militates against a 
domestic analogy. Even with the existence of a well-operating international 
regulatory organization, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), any 
formal legislative outcome tends to be limited, often “minimal,” for several 
reasons.12  
 First of all, a treaty-making process requires an enormous amount of 
diplomatic, and political, efforts necessary to reach both consensus and 
compromise among parties concerned.  Lobbies from interested and 
affected constituencies are legion.13  Naturally, it is not only a painstaking 
but also treacherous process.  So often, the process loses its initial passion 
or momentum as it develops.14  Moreover, a treaty’s legally “binding” 
nature tends to make negotiating parties reluctant in nailing down any 
definite texts, leaving them enough flexibility for future contingencies.15  
Likewise, treaties are often accompanied by reservations, understandings 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are 
Interesting, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 8 (2000) [hereinafter International Economic Law] 
(viewing that “treaties are often an awkward albeit necessary method of designing 
institutions needed in today’s interdependent world, but they do not solve many 
problems”). Cf. Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal, 45 
INT’L ORG. 495, 537–38 (1991) (summarizing the benefits of informal agreements vis-à-vis 
formal agreements (treaties)). 
13 See, e.g., John Cushman Jr., Intense Lobbying Against Global Warming Treaty, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/07/us/intense-lobbying-against-
global-warming-treaty.html; Anup Shah, COP3—Kyoto Protocol Climate Conference, 
GLOBAL ISSUES, Feb. 15, 2002, http://www.globalissues.org/article/183/cop3-kyoto-
protocol-climate-conference; Urging the Oil and Auto Industries to Support the Kyoto 
Protocol, GREENPEACE, Apr. 5, 2001, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/news-and-
blogs/news/urging-the-oil-and-auto-indust/; Andrew C. Revkin, Industry Ignored Its 
Scientists on Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/science/earth/24deny.html. 
14
 See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President at the Opening of 
the Commemoration of 50 Years After Nuremberg: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 
Oct. 17, 1995, available in 1998 WL 608247 (“Internationally, as we meet here, talks are 
underway at the United Nations to establish a permanent international criminal court. 
Rwanda and the difficulties we have had with this special tribunal underscores the need for 
such a court. And the United States will work to see that it is created.”); THE AM. NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., CHRONOLOGY OF US ACTIONS 
RELATED TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
www.amicc.org/docs/US%20Chronology.pdf (2011) (“US votes against the adoption of the 
treaty out of concern that the ICC accuse US nationals of crimes for political reasons.”); 
Henry T. King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward 
for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 47, 52 (1999) (the U.S. “identified 
ideological and political differences with the Statute”). 
15 Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483, 526 (2004). But see 
Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2003) (explaining 
reasons why states may wish to sign onto treaties).   
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and declarations that practically qualify their initial legal effects.16  Finally, 
as a treaty-making process is tortuous, so is its “amending” process.  
Therefore, a regulatory treaty, once fixed, is hard to keep abreast of the 
subsequently altering regulatory environment.  
 These shortcomings of treaties often lead to limited, or failed, 
international cooperation. This in turn causes countries to adhere to their 
own domestic regulations in a unilateral fashion.  This regulatory failure 
tends to be more revealing and thus more problematic in the face of 
contemporary economic interdependence, in particular in times of crisis. 
Global business betrays its frustration in the face of this lack of regulatory 
coordination that is continuously fragmenting the global marketplace 
against the wave of globalization.17  
 As a response to these challenges, new attempts have emerged to 
overcome the problems of the conventional treaty-making process. 
Throughout the world regulators experiencing the same regulatory 
problems, convene frequently, meeting and talking with each other in order 
to enlighten and be enlightened. They establish various kinds of 
relationships, from formal to informal. Occasionally, international 
organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WTO or the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) even 
provide like-minded regulators with a number of fora to interact. Over time, 
relationships become solidified and tend to evolve into systematized 
networks.18  These TRNs invariably produce certain regulatory norms.  The 
recent experience of the G20 in response to a global financial crisis offers a 
propitious pathway toward such a new paradigm of global lawmaking and 
global governance.19 
                                                 
16 University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, U.S. Reservations, Declarations, 
and Understandings to Human Rights Treaties, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/usres.html (last visited June 7, 2011). 
17 See Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 39, 71 
(2006). 
18 See notably Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 535 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, International Law]; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF 
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Government 
Networks].  
19 In fact, the origin of transgovernmental networks dates back to the early seventies 
with the proliferation of UN agencies such as the “United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF),” and the “United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO).” See generally United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), About UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/uwwide/ (last visited on Oct. 30, 2010).  See generally United 
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Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), What is UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/about-us/ (last visited Jul. 13, 2011). “These 
professional agencies flourished under the auspices of the UN as many government 
officials or agencies convened, exchanged views, and undertook joint actions in their 
sector-specific fora. As the Nineties dawned and with the end of the Cold War, both 
exogenous and endogenous factors contributed to the transgovernmental regulatory drive.” 
Sungjoon Cho, Rethinking APEC: A New Experiment for a Post-Modern Institutional 
Arrangement, in WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 401 (Mitsuo Matsushita & 
Dukgeun Ahn eds., 2004).  In this context, it can be said that few purely “domestic” issues 
remain in an era of globalization and interdependence. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), GLOBALIZATION: WHAT CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR GOVERNMENTS (2006), 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=OCDE/GD(96)6
4&docLanguage=En [hereinafter OECD, Globalization]. Likewise, in the United States, 
non-foreign affairs agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the Department of 
Treasury accounted for a dramatic increase (from 1,578 to 2,265: 44%) in the levels of US 
direct hires overseas over the last decade, which mainly reflects the increasing 
“globalization” of US national interests. THE US GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE 
(GAO), OVERSEAS PRESENCE: STAFFING AT US DIPLOMATIC POSTS (REPORT TO THE 
CHAIRMAN, LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON 
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) 18–21 (1994), 
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat2/153262.pdf. Keohane and Nye depicted this phenomenon as 
“societal interdependence” which eventuates “policy interdependence.” Robert O. Keohane 
& Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 
WORLD POL. 39, 61 (1974) [hereinafter Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations]. In 
the same vein, Hopkins also observed that “increased interdependence” elicited many 
important questions, e.g., “how should the world’s food, energy and natural resources be 
shared among the world’s peoples?” Raymond F. Hopkins, Global Management Networks: 
The Internationalization of Domestic Bureaucracies, 30 INT. SOC. SCI. J. 31, 31 (1978). 
Future international transactions including imports and exports would be hampered by 
potential regulatory gaps between domestic and international arenas. As a prescription for 
“global market failure,” Professor Jackson has emphasized the necessity of “human 
institutions” which helps markets to function successfully. International Economic Law, 
supra note 12, at 5. TRNs discussed in this paper, can be said to fall within the rubric of 
such human institutions at large. In addition, technological innovation such as the 
"Internet" has since contributed significantly to the ability to respond to the various 
transgovernmental regulatory needs brought about by globalization. Kal Raustiala, The 
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (2002) (observing that “the rise of. . .the Internet 
has progressively made long-distance communication, and thus networks, far easier. . . .”).  
As Gerard Ruggie aptly observes, this networking phenomenon can be understood as “a 
decentralized yet integrated space-of-flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside 
the spaces-of-places that we call national economies.” John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality 
and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 172 
(1993). Endogenously, government officials have become more professional and expert in 
the face of the aforementioned complicated and turbulent regulatory challenges. Cf. Jane 
Perlez, As Diplomacy Loses Luster, Young Stars Flee State Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 5, 
2000, http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/090500us-statedept.html (quoting 
Mark L. von Hagen, Director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University stating that 
PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR 
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 TRNs have several key characteristics.  First, TRNs are 
“transgovernmental,” rather than “international.” Existing national agencies 
are trans-linked to each other.  They do not assume an international space 
of their own.20   As trans-national, TRNs mainly consists of players from 
the public sector, the working-level government officials.  Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) may play an important role in the 
operation of TRNs they are not the primary actors. 21 For example, the main 
                                                                                                                            
“smart graduates who want to join government are heading for the Departments of the 
Treasury or Commerce.”). This position mirrors that of Keohane and Nye. They limited the 
term “transnational” to nongovernmental actors, and the term “transgovernmental” to 
define sub-units of governments on those occasions when they act relatively autonomously 
from high politics. Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 19, at 41. 
20 Cho, supra note 19, at 401. 
21 For instance, Professor Freeman conceptualizes “public governance” in a novel way 
as a “set of negotiated relationships between the public and the private.” Jody Freeman, 
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548 (2000). According to 
this view, the regulatory decision-making process tends to be decentralized since “public 
and private actors negotiate over policy-making, implementation and enforcement.” Id. As 
a result, more cooperative or “aggregate” notion of accountability is offered as an 
alternative to “formal and hierarchical” accountability that dominates conventional 
administrative law. Id. In some cases, a (private) transnational network plays a cooperative 
and complementary, but sometimes competitive, role vis-à-vis a (public) government 
network. For instance, a private network under the aegis of the FIBV (International 
Federation of Stock Exchanges)—a trade organization for regulated securities and 
derivative markets world-wide—is regarded as a counterpart to a public network under the 
auspice of the IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) which 
represents the world’s governmental agencies involved with the supervision of financial 
markets. The FIBV name has changed to the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), 
About WFE, http://www.world-exchanges.org/about-wfe (last visited on Oct. 30, 2010); 
see also World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), Our Mission, http://www.world-
exchanges.org/about-wfe/our-mission (last visited on Jul. 13, 2011). See also IOSCO 
Historical Background, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background (last 
visited on Oct. 30, 2010). One of its basic role is “to act as the central reference point for 
the industry by offering members guidance in the process of international harmonization of 
business practices,” which is quite complementary to the IOSCO’s regulatory role 
considering that the it is composed of “regulates.” See id. However, some of the FIBV’s 
(WFE’s) goals—i.e., “to maintain a platform for securities markets professionals to discuss 
issues of common interest”—may overlap with those of the IOSCO, in which sense the 
relationship between these two networks can be depicted as “competitive.” See id. 
Meanwhile, it is worthy of highlighting that the two networks interact (network) with each 
other, for instance, by participating in the other’s meetings. WFE, WFE Becomes Affiliate 
Member of IOSCO, http://www.world-exchanges.org/news-views/news/wfe-becomes-
affiliate-member-iosco, (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). Another example of such interaction 
(networking) between a transnational (private) network and a transgovernmental (public) 
regulatory network can be found in the relationship between the IFCI (International 
Finance and Commodities Institute), and the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and 
the IOSCO. The IFCI, a non-profit organization nesting a network among the world’s 
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banking network, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) is 
comprised of the central bank governors from 27 countries.22 
 Second, a TRN is “regulatory” in nature, which means deals with 
particular regulatory issues or problems.23  Thus, TRNs differ from “trans-
judicial networks”, which involve judges from different jurisdictions 
exchanging views.24  For example, the major insurance network, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), sets standards 
meant to guide national insurance regulators in their regulation of insurers. 
25 
 Third, it is a “network.”  The network concept can cover a range of 
gatherings, but the most important feature of a network is that it is a 
“process” rather than an “entity.”26 The process allows a TRN to be 
positioned in a symbiotic relationship with conventional international 
organizations.  In other words, networking as a process can take place in an 
international organization qua entity. The process capitalizes on  a 
“common ’belief’ or ’faith’  . . . to better regulatory outcomes” amongst 
networkers.27 This common belief is most likely to stem from common 
“experience” and “knowledge” shared by participants of the network, i.e., 
professional working-level government officials28 International 
                                                                                                                            
major derivatives exchange and financial firms, web-posts a quarterly updated library of 
about 100 official documents contributed by major international regulatory organizations 
such as the BIS and the IOSCO. IOSCO Library of Public Documents, 
http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?whereami=pubdocs (last visited Jul. 14, 2011). 
Despite these rich interaction between transnational (private) networks and 
transgovernmental (public) regulatory networks, such transnational (private) networks 
should be understood as complementary to the transgovernmental (public) network in 
terms of regulatory function. Although the “new medievalists” proclaim the end of the 
nation-state thanks to the “information technology revolution”, private power is still no 
substitute for state power, and a gain in power by non-state actors does not necessarily 
translate into a loss of power for the state. SLAUGHTER, supra note 18, at 184. Likewise, 
Sol Picciotto also acknowledges the validity of states itself, though he observed a new 
trend of disintegration within them. Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic 
Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & 
BUS. 1014, 1014–22 (1996–97). 
22 Banking for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: 
About the Basel Committee, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011). 
23 Cho, supra note 19, at 402. 
24 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (exploring the commonalities among, and consequences of, 
several instances of transjudicial communication). Cho, supra note 19, at 402 . 
25 International Association of Insurance Supervisors, http://www.iaisweb.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2011).  
26 Cho, supra note 19, at 381. 
27 Id. 
28 In the context of Western social and philosophical traditions, one may attribute a 
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organizations often provide government networkers with physical forums 
while some TRNs may even mirror the operational format of international 
organizations.29 Therefore, any physical body or even a more fluid 
relationship may fall under this category once it meets certain requirements 
characterizing it as a network.30  For example, the Banking Network, which 
includes the BCBS, can operate within the IMF.  
 Already in the early seventies, Keohane & Nye observed this 
phenomenon among like-minded government officials and labeled it as 
“transgovernmental coalition building.”31 They highlighted a “sense of 
collegiality” developed and reinforced by their membership in common 
profession, which may be analogous to the “epistemic community” as Peter 
Haas famously dubbed it.32. Likewise, Eugene A. Ludwig, the former 
Comptroller of the Currency submitted that “I am convinced that all 
regulators today share a common concern that spans geographical 
boundaries and transcends cultural barriers. All of us speak the shared 
language of safety and soundness.”33  Naturally, it is this shared 
professional or expert culture which tends to secure a high level of 
compliance with what a TRN produces as a normative output.34 Perhaps this 
fidelity to network-generated norms can be said to result from a 
bureaucratic habit or bureaucratic culture that is analogous to the “law 
habit.”35    
                                                                                                                            
theoretical root of this transgovernmental regulatory network to the notion of “social 
epistemes,” connoting both German tradition of viewing society as “comprising webs of 
meaning and signification” and French tradition of exploring “mentalités collectives.” 
Ruggie, supra note 19, at 157. 
29 See Raustiala, supra note 19, at 6, 88 (identifying a “synergistic” relationship 
between treaties and networks due to the former’s political and institutional contributions 
to the latter). 
30 Cho, supra note 19, at 402. 
31 Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 19, at 44. 
32 Id. at 45; Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT. ORG. 1 (1992). 
33 John E. Shockey, Bank Regulatory Examination and Enforcement after Barings and 
Daiwa, 935 PLI / CORP. 681, 708 (1996). 
34 Here, the meaning of compliance is mostly limited to a soft dimension in the 
absence of any technically binding force.  If the concept of compliance involves a hard 
(political) dimension, such as national legislation, as it often does in public international 
law, it invites a whole range of different issues, such as the depth of compliance and the 
measurement.   
35 David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of 
International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281, 303 n.189 
(1998); Richard R. Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety", 29 INT'L & COMP. 
L.Q. 549, 556 (1980). In building up such common belief and faith, another psychological 
element, namely “trust” serves as an important catalyst. See Scott H. Jacobs, Why 
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 TRNs involve an ongoing dialogue, although the fora for that 
dialogue may change.36 Early in the Seventies, Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye, in their pioneering work, developed a notion of “complex 
interdependence” ideal type of international relations, which correlated a 
reluctance to resort to the use of force among a group of states with 
“multiple channels of contact connecting societies.”37 A subset of their 
notion of complex interdependence is the phenomenon of 
“transgovernmental communication”, the existence of “informal ties 
between government elites” and direct meetings and communications 
between bureaucrats from different countries, which coexist with formal 
foreign office arrangements.38 Raymond Hopkins also highlights this 
dialogical process in developing working relationships through “telephone 
calls, correspondence, regular meetings and pre-meeting agenda sessions.”39  
 TRNs work incrementally though day-to-day interactions.  These 
interactions are un-dramatic if not mundane, but they can have an enormous 
affect.40  For example, the Supervisory Information Framework for 
Derivatives and Trading Activities (Joint Report by the BCBS and the 
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO)), which was issued to the public on September 
1998, was a revised version of an earlier similar report jointly published in 
May 1995 by the same TRNs to assess the derivatives activities of banks 
and securities firms.41  This revision represents on-going and cumulative 
                                                                                                                            
Governments Must Work Together, OECD OBSERVER No. 186 (Feb./Mar. 1994) at 14 
[hereinafter Jacobs, Work Together]. Therefore, government officials may have to invest 
more time in communicating better among each other as well as familiarizing themselves 
with one another’s administrative style for the sake of a successful networking. Id. See also 
Les Metcalfe, The Weakest Links: Building Organizational Networks for an Interdependent 
World, in REGULATORY CO-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 49, 57 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Economic Co-operation and 
Development ed., 1994) (arguing that the establishment of “trust and confidence” among 
the organizations participating in a regulatory system has an important bearing on the 
reliability of an inter-organizational network). But see Jeffrey Atik, Science and 
International Regulatory Convergence, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 736 (1996–97) 
(questioning the possibility of expert consensus by arguing that “scientific consensus is 
geographically distributed and flows from centers of influence.”). 
36 Cho, supra note 19, at 403. 
37 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 25 (1977) 
[hereinafter Keohane & Nye, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE]; Robert O. Keohane & 
Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, 41 INT’L ORG. 725, 731 (1987); 
Slaughter, International Law, supra note 18, at 512–13. 
38 Id., at 25–26; Slaughter, International Law, supra note 18, at 513. 
39 Hopkins, supra note 19, at 36. 
40 Cho, supra note 19, at 403. 
41 THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION & THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE 
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efforts by the BCBS and IOSCO with a view to keeping pace with an ever-
changing regulatory environment in this area, namely, “financial innovation 
and progress in risk management field for trading and derivatives activities, 
in particular with regard to market risk.” 42 It reflects earlier work of the two 
TRNs including the 1994 Joint Release of Guidelines for improving risk 
management of derivatives activities and subsequent risk management 
guidance as well as the 1995 Joint Recommendations for Enhancing Public 
Disclosure.43 
 Thus, we see the products of TRNs undergo evolution.  This 
evolutionary nature ensures streamlined and updated regulatory guidelines 
so that policy measures reflect the ever-changing regulatory environment.  
The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) Forum provides 
another apt example. APEC houses a variety of TRNs. It works through 
everyday communications among sector-specific actors (government 
officials and businessmen). In various subjects such as energy, 
telecommunication or transportation functional Working Groups exist to 
devise a detailed work program based on cooperation.44 The APEC Food 
System (AFS) illustrates an evolution of a regulatory prototype.  In 1999 the 
APEC leaders adopted the AFS upon the recommendation by the APEC 
Business Advisory Council (ABAC) in order to “efficiently link together 
food production, food processing and consumption to meet the food needs 
of our people as an essential part of achieving sustainable growth, equitable 
development and stability in the APEC region.”45 The “Agricultural 
Technical Cooperation Working Group (ATCWG)” is a key implementer of 
the AFS recommendations concerning “efficiency in agricultural 
production, supply and trade, including the importance of technology, 
adding value to agricultural production and improving infrastructure.”46 
This AFS/ATCWG network enabled APEC Senior Officials to review food 
policies in the APEC area and establish the “APEC Food Security Work 
                                                                                                                            
OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS (“IOSCO”), FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERVISORY 
INFORMATION ABOUT DERIVATIVES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES (1998), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs39.pdf.  
42 Id. 
43 Id.  
44 See Martin Rudner, Institutional Approaches to Regional Trade and Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific Area, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 173–75 (1994). 
“Consequently, unlike other formal international organizations, the APEC retains a strong 
potential that regulatory challenges are duly ‘managed’, rather than ‘solved.’” Cho, supra 
note 19, at 401.   
45 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Food System, 
http://www.apec.org/Groups/Other-Groups/APEC-Food-System.aspx (last visited on Oct. 
31, 2010).  
46 Id. 
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Plan” in response to the rise in regional food prices in 2008.47 
 In conclusion, TRNs have been around for some time.  They have 
arisen in part in response to the weaknesses in the treaty system to tackle 
pressing needs of globalization. They are also the function of professional 
expert communities that share understandings and a desire to find solutions 
to common problems.  The means by which they find these solutions 
involves a process, although a process that can be situated within a number 
of institutional fora, or not.  This process is dialogical, norm-generating, and 
incremental and involves a number of tools that we refer to as intra-network 
dynamics.  The power of these networks results from the intra network 
dynamics they foster and the end products that they develop.   
 
 
II. A THEORY OF NETWORK COORDINATION: PRE-EXISTING NETWORKS, 
REGULATORY PRODUCTS, AND OPERATIVE FRAMEWORKS  
 
 States can address complex problems through coordination of TRNs.  
By constructing frameworks (or blueprints) that chart goals for various 
TRNs, States can tackle complex systemic regulatory challenges.  These 
frameworks instruct TRNs to work towards specific goals.  TRNs are well-
suited for the tasks assigned to them because of pre-existing relationships 
and network dynamics of the network participants.  These dynamics allow 
TRNs to develop specific end products called “regulatory prototypes” 
which can be absorbed into domestic structures through a variety of 
strategies to fulfill the goals of the blueprint or framework. This 
coordination of TRNs can lead to complex regulatory responses to global 
problems that are well-suited for adoption at the national level.  We probe 
examples of this phenomenon in Part III. We discuss whether these 
responses are desirable from a legitimacy and efficacy standpoint in Part 
IV. 
  
A.  A Theory of TRN Coordination 
 
 TRN coordination involves governmental coalitions organizing 
multifaceted responses to global regulatory challenges by leveraging the 
capital of pre-existing networks to develop specific regulatory products 
meant to be nationalized. Government groupings (such as the G7, G8 or the 
                                                 
47 Id. 
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G20) have coordinated responses to political challenges or crisis.48  Using 
action plans, called frameworks or blueprints, these groupings can instruct 
multiple actors, and in particular TRNs, to take action simultaneously and in 
pursuit of a common objective.     
 To tackle cross-border, cross-sectoral problems States sometimes 
develop frameworks or blueprints, which embody basic agendas or action 
plans, rather than specific standards. A coordinating coalition builds these 
agendas and tasks various actors with the production of more specific 
regulatory prototypes.  These plans form in part out of a common 
understanding of the problem and the need for a coordinated response.  
International regulators, and even leaders, share a belief in the necessity of 
these plans, they understand and agree that some regulations require not 
only cross-border coordination but cross-network coordination.    
 Frameworks emerged long before the 2008 crisis.49  For example, in 
1996 the G20 Finance Ministers created the Joint Forum, a blueprint of 
collaboration amongst the BCBS, IOSCO and the IAIS. The Forum is 
staffed by technical efforts from each of the parent’s organizations and its 
blueprint requires that it focus on particular subjects of interests to each of 
the parent entities, including risk assessment, capital adequacy and the 
regulation of financial conglomerates.50  In short, the blueprint for the Joint 
Forum recognized the need for a cross-sectoral approach on financial 
conglomerates. The blueprint involves all three entities (the BCBS, IOSCO 
and the IAIS) in an action plan that focuses on primarily two lines of 
inquiry (capital risk and conglomerate supervision). 51 
 Frameworks are generally unambiguous since they set out specific 
                                                 
48 Robert P. Delonis, Note, International Financial Standards and Codes: Mandatory 
Regulation Without Representation, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 563, 586–91 (2004). See 
generally, Mario Giovanoli, The Reform of International Financial Architecture After the 
Global Crisis, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 81 (2009). 
49 As seen in the G7 or G8 experiences, major economies had tried to coordinate their 
financial and macroeconomic policies in the past.  See, e.g., JOHN KIRTON & ANTARA 
HALDAR, G8 RESEARCH GROUP, G7/8 SUMMIT REMIT MANDATES, 1975–2003 (2003), 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/factsheet/factsheet_remits.html (listing mandates 
including, “At our next Summit, we will review progress on the implementation of the G8 
Africa Action Plan on the basis of a final report from our Personal Representatives for 
Africa,” “Our goal for the next Summit is to develop an international financing plan for 
plutonium management and disposition based on a detailed project plan, and a multilateral 
framework to co-ordinate this co-operation,” “We are determined to speed up the 
implementation of our national plans called for under the Rio Climate Treaty and we will 
each report what we have achieved at next year's Summit.”). 
50 See Bank for International Settlements, Mandate of the Joint Forum, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/jfmandate.htm (last visited Jan. 2. 2011). 
51 Id. 
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tasks for corresponding networks. Nonetheless they will lack the level of 
technical precision required in the case of “regulatory prototypes.”52  While 
these blueprints may assign each particular network a specific task, they 
may still be silent exactly how such task will be operationalized. Initially, 
though, the blueprint sets a plan at the network coordination level.  Thus, it 
is the first step in a multi-layered process of cross-networking.  
 Since a framework or blueprint denotes a “long-term” plan, its 
actualization necessarily involves several incremental steps on different 
levels, such as working-level officials, deputy ministers, ministers, and 
leaders of the various TRNs.  What is noteworthy is that these several 
incremental processes may proceed at the same time through simultaneous 
rounds of dialogue and communication among the network actors. It is in 
this sense which a blueprint plants seeds for subsequent networking and 
consequent regulatory prototype-building.  
 The individual TRNs gain strength and legitimacy from being part 
of the overall plan in the same way that the overall plan legitimizes itself 
through the use of the pre-existing networks. By infusing a large dose of 
political capital in largely uncoordinated pre-existing sector-specific 
government TRNs, States legitimize these networks while at the same time 
leveraging their capital and legitimacy.    TRN capital results from their 
prior workings and in particular results from complex intra-network 
dynamics.  
 
B.  Intra-Network Dynamism 
 
 TRN coordination takes advantage of the pre-existing intra-network 
dynamics that exists among networkers.  These varying modes of internal 
social dynamics represent different operationalizing forces in each network.  
They are main engines of networks that the executive coordinator (G20) 
maneuvers.  While these dynamics have already been present in each 
network before, it was the advent of the G20 which awakened their genuine 
regulatory potential in an unprecedented endeavor to deliver desperate 
regulatory effects to avert the financial crisis.   
 While TRN participants share mutual trust distilled from the same 
expert belief, their knowledge base or experience may vary. Several 
dynamics are at play as they work through these differences, we label them: 
“persuasion,” “negotiation,” “strategic co-optation,” “willing 
marginalization,” “responsive engagement” and “expert sympathization.” 
These features fall neatly into a constructivist toolbox.  Constructivist 
scholars have long posited that institutions shape the preferences of 
                                                 
52 See infra notes 62 to 83 and accompanying text. 
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participants.53 By indentifying the dynamics, the tools, the dialogues and 
discourses that network players use to influence each other we hope to be 
able to reveal how preferences may change – or appear to change.  
Coordinated TRNs take advantage of these dynamics to pursue specific 
regulatory end products that are part of a planned coordinated response to a 
global problem.  Unpacking the dynamics at work is important for the later 
task of assessing the efficacy and legitimacy of the ultimate response.  
First, participants in TRNs may simply influence (“persuade”) each 
other into changing the other party’s regulatory behavior.  Suppose that A is 
a specific regulatory agency of Country X and B is a corresponding agency 
in Country Y.  By providing better regulatory information or more 
advanced technology A can persuade B to adjust the latter’s original policy 
stance. This type of interaction often leads to a diffusive and osmotic mode 
of regulatory change, rather than a commandeering mode.54 Here, for 
example it is entirely conceivable that a developed country member may 
provide certain technical assistance or advice with a developing country 
member to reinforce the former’s persuasive power. After all, networks can 
explain more subtle dynamics than mere legislation in regulatory agencies’ 
behavioral change.55 To fully capture the intra-network dynamics behind 
this regulatory persuasion, one needs to recall one of the defining 
characteristics of a TRN discussed above, i.e., a social bond among sector-
specific government agencies or officials (networkers). This endogenous 
nature of social interaction among networkers enables us to factor in the 
“normative self-understanding of the ends held by the social groups in 
question.” 56 This is why constructivism may provide a richer account than 
conventional international relations theories, such as realism, as to the 
“sticky”57 bond among social actors (here, networkers).58  
                                                 
53 See John Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and 
the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT'L ORG. 855, 856, 870 (1998); Alexander 
Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
384, 385–87 (1994); Claire Kelly, The Value Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Regimes and the 
Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop 22 MICH. J INT’L L. 673, 678 (2001). 
54 Raustiala, supra note 19, at 51. 
55 Id., at 54 (observing that networks “touch on issues such as the structure of 
enforcement and the training of personnel.”). 
56 Ruggie, supra note 53, at 860; see generally MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch, eds. & trans., 1949).  
57 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599, 2603 (1997).  
58 This normative intersubjectivity generates “critical self-reflection” which “gives us 
perspective on our social environment and helps us to overcome any false sense of 
determinism.” ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 375 
(1999). 
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Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks present perhaps the strongest 
version of persuasion. Adopting a sociological concept of “acculturation,” 
they raise the possibility of social actors’ assimilation to the “beliefs and 
behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.”59 Interestingly, this 
acculturation results more from a structural cognitive pressure to assimilate 
within the group than from the “merits” of a particular model.60 Under this 
circumstance, however, networking is prone to two types of criticism. First, 
any behavioral change in this situation might be an ostensible conformity, 
rather than a genuine modification of an earlier position.61 Second, 
politically less powerful members of the group might be pressured into 
accepting certain regulatory models prescribed by powerful members 
without due consideration of actual merits of such models.62  
 Second, in some cases, A and B can “negotiate” over a common 
subject and reach an agreement on the basis of quid pro quo. This may 
occur in a “Record of Understanding (ROU)" or a “Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU)”. While this mode of interaction inevitably involves 
some type of bargain, it should not necessarily be equated with a political, 
strategic give-and-take process which is often seen in the conventional 
international treaty negotiation. Importantly, an intra-network negotiation 
need not be a zero sum gain.  It involves the participants of the TRN 
continuously adjusting their different interpretations and eventually 
expanding their shared grounds. In this regard, an intra-network negotiation 
may be understood as a “cross-persuasion”: one party’s persuasion is 
contingent on that of the other party. The dynamic outcome of such 
negotiation as a cross-persuasion is likely to be a positive-sum, which is 
capable of generating regulatory convergence.  For example, the U.S. might 
accept the EU ’s position in favor of stricter CRA regulation in exchange 
for the latter’s adoption of a variant of the former’s Volker rule.63 
 Third, a strategic co-optation can take place among network 
participants. “Strategic co-optation,” as described by Selznick, is the 
“process of absorbing new elements into the leadership of the policy-
determining structure of an organization to avert threats to its stability or 
existence.”64 For example, one network actor might invite another to serve 
as a “policy advisor” for a regulatory project, perhaps because the first 
                                                 
59 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004). 
60 Id. at 643. 
61 Id. 
62 See infra sub-pt. IV-B.  
63 We owe Pierre-Hugues Verdier for this point. 
64
 See Ronald S. BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND COOPTATION 5 (1983). 
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networker lacks the necessary capacity to act alone.65 This self-invoking 
nature distinguishes co-optation from other modes of intra-network 
dynamics, such as persuasion or negotiation, in which case the pressure for 
regulatory behavioral change comes from outside. 
 Fourth, network members may engage in “willing marginalization.”  
Willing marginalization happens when network members agree to 
participate knowing that they will have limited influence.  Members may be 
motivated by the hope that even a reserved mode of participation now will 
lead to greater future participation. Thus, suppose that a network member A 
supports a position X, which is generally disfavored by another network 
member B.  Suppose further that B has very little influence. Here, B might 
still welcome an invitation by A to collaborate.   A may be engaging in a 
persuasion leading to the willing marginalization of B.  Lastly, network 
members may face the real possibility that their choice is to simply remain 
in the network, with limited influence, or be out of the network.  Being in 
the network may be the better alternative not only because they may hope 
for greater influence in the future but because membership may signal 
acceptance or other important values to other constituencies.66   
Fifth, “responsive engagement” involves a rich set of regulatory 
dialogues that could potentially result in a certain level of compromise even 
though the negotiation is not completely successful. Although less than the 
desired outcome is reached in responsive engagement, the process of 
engaging itself moves the network forward. It signals that the parties are 
willing to cooperate, at least on some issues, even if they are unsuccessful 
on others for the time being. Given the network operation is a dynamic and 
incremental process, responsive engagement is critical in maintaining a 
stable level of sociological momentum regardless of any regulatory deal. In 
other words, the network process is not a binary (on/off) communication but 
a thread of mutually reinforcing engagement. When this interaction reaches 
a certain critical point, a certain regulatory product, be it an MOU or a 
policy guideline, tends to materialize.  
Finally, a preliminary regulatory product molded initially by a 
bilateral dialogue between A and B may spill over and be multilateralized 
through like-minded regulators from other jurisdictions. This “expert 
sympathization” is a necessary step to formulate any common regulatory 
                                                 
65 Sungjoon Cho, Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framework: Are They the Achilles’ 
Heel of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process?, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 311, 346, n.188 (1998).  
66 See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of 
International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 504 (2005) (arguing that one of the collateral 
consequences of international organization membership, and commitment to its attendant 
obligations, shapes the way other actors, States, NGO’s and domestic individuals, view the 
state). 
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guidelines or principles within a government network. This type of intra-
network dynamics can be found in most networks, such as the BCBS or the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which produce policy 
guidelines or recommendations on a regular basis. 
 Importantly, these six types of intra-network dynamics offer useful 
analytical lenses through which one can understand how a TRN functions in 
an incremental, dialogical, and norm-generating manner. These tools are 
inherently incremental in one can see how some modes are intermediary 
steps in others. For example, a persuasion might lead to willing 
marginalization.  Responsive engagement is a step in negotiation. These 
dynamics comprise the very dialogue of the TRNs.  They are the substance 
of the conferences, informal talks, and telephone calls.  There are the 
constituent parts of both the substantive outcomes and the process of 
bringing the networks together. Eventually, these dynamics facilitate the 
norm-generating process. They result in normative end products.  
 
C.  End Products: Regulatory Prototypes 
 
 TRNs create end products, which we label “regulatory 
prototypes.”67  They generate rules, norms, or standards to deal with 
specific problems they face. The regulatory prototype is often labeled as a 
guideline or recommendation, which features the typical “soft law.”  These 
end products logically flow from the network operation that is dialogical, 
incremental, and norm-generating.68 They fulfill the framework or blueprint 
                                                 
67 Other scholars have employed different terms. See e.g., Zaring, supra note 35, at 303 
n.188 (citing Hal Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basel Capital Accord, 39 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 885 (1995) (referring to the Basel Accord as a “gentlemen’s agreement 
among central banks.”)). See also JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK 
SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 176–77, 261–262 (1995); see Zaring, supra note 35, at 303 
n.188 (“international soft law”). Cf. Linda M. Harasim, Global Networks: An Introduction, 
in GLOBAL NETWORK: COMPUTERS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 13–14 (Linda 
M. Harasim ed., 1993). Kumon and Aizu propose “co-emulation” as a strategy for 
developing a global hypernetwork society of the future. To them, co-emulation is a 
“response to the information age whereby nations can learn from one another to produce a 
prototype socio-economic model that each country can mold to fit its unique history and 
culture,” and it encourages nations to “move beyond competitive relationships into more 
consensual relationships” to address a variety of socio-economic challenges of the twenty-
first century. See id. See also Eibe Riedel, Standards and Sources: Farewell to the 
Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International Law?, 2 EUR. J. INT’L  L. 58, 79 (1991) 
(discussing “new economic standards” with the proliferation of international economic 
transactions). 
68 This process can also be viewed as “dialectical” in the sense that this process 
illustrates how prototypes can eventually be transformed into more acceptable, and in a 
sense more legitimate, norms than one found in a conventional treaty. This dialectical 
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established by the coordinating States.  
A regulatory prototype, such as a guideline or a policy 
recommendation, tends to represent a converging output of networking 
results. Considering the incremental nature of networking, an overzealous 
attempt to envisage quick regulatory change will be futile, or even 
counterproductive.69  Yet, this circumspection does not necessarily mean 
that a TRN always blocks participants from voluntarily adopting a more 
advanced regulatory position. As discussed above, a variety of intra-
network dynamics, such as persuasion and responsive engagement, 
encourage network participants to espouse the “best practices”, “regulatory 
benchmarks” or “regulatory checklists,” which may even exceed the least 
common denominators, so as to speedily achieve necessary regulatory 
goals.70 While the regulatory prototype may be nonbinding,71 it also tends to 
                                                                                                                            
process represents the whole life cycle of a prototype throughout the sequence of its 
creation, nationalization (where necessary), enforcement, surveillance, feedback and 
establishment of a new prototype. 
69 For instance, the “OECD Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against 
‘Hard Core’ Cartels” represents a minimum common denominator (“hard core” cartels) in 
the competition policy area that results from a long-standing networking in this regulatory 
field centering on the “OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy” which brings 
together the leaders of the world’s major competition, or antitrust, authorities and provides 
the chief international forum for the regular exchange of views on important competition 
policy issues. OECD, Competition Law and Policy: About, 
http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en_2649_34685_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jul. 
13, 2011). See also OECD, Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard 
Core Cartels, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_2649_40381615_44942291_1_1_1_1,00.htm
l (last visited Jul. 13, 2011).  
70 OECD, OECD Reference Checklist for Regulatory Decision-Making, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/10/35220214.pdf (last visited July 26, 2011). However, 
such “best practices” are not necessarily for the sake of harmonization, neither for 
regulatory competition to a higher level of regulatory quality (race-to-the-top). Best 
practices are just used as an example or a reference for a future design of a regulation. It 
should be noted that under some circumstances “regulatory diversity” would be a better 
option than harmonization or any other type of regulatory cooperation since the diversity of 
preference, such as the degree of risk-taking is sometimes irreconcilable. Scott H. Jacobs, 
Regulatory Competition for an Interdependent World: Issues for Government, in 
REGULATORY COOPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, 15, 33 (1994). Cf. DAVID 
VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 6 (1995) (discussing the so-called “California effect” which means an upward 
regulatory competition in the environmental policies among trading states in the US). 
71 See OECD, Regulatory Reform and International Standardization, Working Party of 
the Trade Committee, TD/TC/WP(98)36/FINAL, 28–32 (1999), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/19/1955309.pdf (discussing “regulators as players in 
standardization.”).  
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be technical and precise.72   
 Empirical confirmations of regulatory prototype are legion. For 
example, the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, 
released by the BCBS on September 22, 1997, were intended to “serve as a 
basic reference” for banking authorities throughout the world in supervising 
and regulating banks and banking activities within their jurisdiction.73  
Likewise, principles included in the Resolution on the Supervision of 
Financial Conglomerates designed by IOSCO in October 1992 were 
understood to “form the basis for the risk assessment of financial 
conglomerates and to “guide the development of regulatory practice in the 
area of financial conglomerates.74  The APEC network serves as another 
example. One of the most representative sectors in the APEC in which such 
guidelines and principles proliferate is the "standards and conformances" 
sector. The Sub-committee on Standards and Conformance75 completed 
Guidelines for the Preparation, Adoption and Review of Technical 
Regulations and APEC Food MRA (Mutual Recognition Arrangement) 
Supplementary Material in 1997.76Regardless of its technical format, the 
normative value of this prototype can be advanced by the very fact that 
expert participants of the network sharing the common belief have worked 
                                                 
72 Cho, supra note 19, at 403. 
73 Statement of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, Jan. 19, 1998, http://www.bis.org/press/p980119.htm [hereinafter Press 
Release, Basel Committee]. 
74
 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS (IOSCO), A RESOLUTION ON THE SUPERVISION OF 
FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES (1992) 
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES7.pdf.  More recently, the IOSCO 
documented a comprehensive set of 30 principles of securities regulations, which are based 
on three fundamental objectives of securities regulation—the protection of investors; 
ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; the reduction of systemic risk. 
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS (IOSCO), OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION (2003) http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (last 
visited on Oct. 31, 2010). These 30 principles—grouped into eight categories (principles 
relating to the regulator; principles for self-regulations; principles for the enforcement of 
securities regulation; principles for cooperation in regulation; principles for issuers; 
principles for collective investment schemes; principles for market intermediaries; 
principles for the secondary market)—are to be nationalized in due forms considering 
domestic legal structure and other circumstances. Id. 
75 The Sub-committee on Standards and Conformance (SCSC) was established under 
the committee for Trade and Investment (CTI), inter alias, to encourage alignment of 
members’ standards with international standards and to achieve mutual recognition among 
APEC economies of conformity assessment in regulated and voluntary sectors. 
76 See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, The Sub-Committee on Standards and 
Conformance, http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/Sub-
Committee-on-Standards-and-Conformance.aspx (last visited on Oct. 31, 2010). 
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out this prototype via various modes of dynamics.77  
 Guidelines or recommendation prototypes are designed to be 
nationalized.78 Under certain circumstances, a soft prototype may be 
hardened as a part (or a whole) of a statute in the domestic legal system.79 
                                                 
77 See also Slaughter, Government Networks, supra note 18, at 211 (arguing for 
effectiveness of the Basel Committee’s system of enforcement despite its informality). In 
this sense, one might reasonably speculate that such prototype (soft law) would form a new 
pattern of “custom” in terms of public international law since the requirements of both 
established practice and opinio juris would be met because transgovernmental regulators 
repetitively refer to those prototypes with a strong normative attitude regardless of its 
technical non-bindingness. Cf. Stephen Zamora, Is There Customary International 
Economic Law?, 32 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 9, 34–5 (1989) (discussing the “soft law” 
nature of customary international economic law).  As a matter of fact, this regulatory 
prototype corresponds to the current reality of harmonization as seen, for example, in the 
EU context. Contemporary regulatory harmonization is conducted not in light of 
“specification” standards, but in light of “performance” standards. Giandomenico Majone, 
Comparing Strategies of Regulatory Rapprochement, in REGULATORY COOPERATION FOR 
AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, 155, 163–5 (1994).  In other words, instead of attempting to 
universalize regulatory standards based on detailed specifications, certain “essential 
requirements” based on functions or performances are highlighted. Id. Regarding the “New 
Approach” to technical harmonization and standardization, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVES BASED ON THE NEW APPROACH AND THE 
GLOBAL APPROACH 7 (2000),  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-
goods/files/blue-guide/guidepublic_en.pdf [hereinafter Guide]. In turn, this approach 
focusing on essential requirements provides ample room for regulatory maneuvering in 
implementation stage on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, the concept of “equivalency” 
becomes critical in assessing regulations of different jurisdictions and in determining 
whether a certain regulation is compatible with a harmonized standard.  See e.g., 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 A, 1867 
U.N.T.S. at 493, art. 6. This determination is called a “conformity assessment” process. See 
Guide, supra note 77, at 8 (regarding the “Global Approach” to certification and testing 
related to conformity assessment).  Therefore, regulatory prototypes symbolize the current 
harmonization practices in the sense that they represent essential regulatory requirements 
as principles or guidelines and implementation details are left to each domestic authority. 
Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication, supra note 2, at 580–87. 
78 Slaughter submits that this “nationalization of international law” is an important 
dimension of effectiveness of government networks. She argues that: 
“The result is an international rule-making process that directly engages national 
officials and national promulgation and enforcement mechanisms, without formal 
translation and implementation mechanisms form the international to the 
national.” Slaughter, Government Networks, supra note 18, at 217.  
Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities 
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 924–25 (2009). 
79 Malloy emphasized on the importance of such “hardening ” process crystallizing 
into the implementation and enforcement. Regarding the BIS capital adequacy guidelines 
and the Second Banking Directive in the EC, he argues that successful implementation and 
enforcement of these two initiatives may provided the basis for the future development of a 
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Notably, certain TRNs provide a variety of strategies to encourage 
participants to implement and enforce these prototypes in the domestic 
dimension. For example, they request participants to perform self-
evaluations to monitor their compliance with those prototypes.80 Harold 
Koh depicts this implementation aspect as a “transnational legal process” in 
which “norm-entrepreneurs” from an “interpretive community” mobilize 
issue networks to embed these regulatory prototypes in the domestic legal-
political system via a series of socialization processes, such as interaction, 
interpretation and internalization.81 
 Interestingly, these soft prototypes can also be hardened in the 
subsequent treaty-making process. As Kal Raustiala aptly observes, “soft 
law is often seen as a stepping-stone to hard law, permitting states to begin 
cooperation informally when they fear the impact of a fully legally binding 
commitment.”82 This soft law-turned-treaty phenomenon is particularly 
fathomable considering the fact that treaties often support the formation of 
networks by supplying to the latter political support (in terms of acceptance 
or acquiescence of network phenomena) as well as institutional support (in 
terms of personnel and budget).83 
                                                                                                                            
“strong force” converged pattern of regulation. Michael P. Malloy, Bumper Cars: Themes 
of Convergence in International Regulation, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S21 (1992). 
However, the hardening process may be hard in a constitutional matter because many 
supervisory authorities, e.g., central banks, may not have legislative competence to convert 
those guidelines or principles into a hard statute. Press Release, Basel Committee, supra 
note 73. Nonetheless, the Basel Committee keeps on monitoring the application of such 
principles “in all material aspects” and indirectly presses domestic legislators to harden 
such soft laws. Id. 
80 See.e.g., IOSCO, Report on the Self-Evaluation Conducted by IOSCO Members 
Pursuant to the 1994 IOSCO Resolution on “Commitment to Basic IOSCO Principles of 
High Regulatory Standards and Mutual Cooperation and Assistance (Nov. 1997), available 
at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD76.pdf (last visited on July 26, 
2011).  
81 Koh, supra note 57, at 2602, 2648, 2639. 
82 Raustiala, supra note 19, at 86; Karmel & Kelly, supra note 78, at  924–25. 
83 Raustiala, supra note 19, at 88. In sum, two dominant courses may encapsulate the 
soft norm-generating mechanism within a government network. First, a contextualized rule 
(a rule that depends on the circumstance, such as a particular national regulation) may get 
decontextualized as its core precepts (general principles) are abstracted. As an initial 
normative reference, those contextualized norms are often labeled “best practices” or 
“templates.” Second, network participants discuss and debate on these de-contextualized 
rules (principles) and embody a regulatory prototype. This prototype is a “model” for 
future application—e.g. maybe a model law on cross border insolvency. This prototype can 
then be re-contextualized or nationalized later in each jurisdiction through various 
transmission mechanisms. For example, it can be transformed into a domestic statute (from 
soft to hard) or a domestic administrative guideline (from soft to soft). See ROBERT Y. 
JENNINGS, THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (1960) (stating that “development of 
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 III. COORDINATING NETWORKS: THE G20 AS A CASE STUDY 
 
The G20 Leaders evolved from a rather mundane network of 
Finance Ministers to a unique leaders group functioning as an executive 
coordinator of a response to the financial crisis of 2008. The G20 Leaders 
coordinate the activities of the Banking and Finance Ministers, the 
Securities Commissioners, the Insurance Network and the Trade Network.  
Chronicling the G20’s development as an TRN coordinator, and reviewing 
its coordination of these various issue-specific networks, allows us view 
examples of intra-network dynamics and raise questions concerning the 
implications of these dynamics.  What is new to us concerns the unique 
“executive” role self-imposed on the G20 to steer this largely discrete set of 
sector-specific TRNs into a coherent fashion under a long-term time-
horizon.  We explore the implications of this coordination in light of the 
network dynamics at play in the TRNs in Part IV.  
  
A.  The Evolution of the G20 into a Coordinating Executive 
 
 For some time, groups of countries have coordinated both economic 
and foreign affairs policies using periodic meetings of high level officials.  
These “G” (for Group) meetings started in the 1970s with the G5 (France, 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) discussing 
financial and economic matters.84  The meetings involve meetings among 
heads of state. This group expanded to the G7 in the 1980’s (adding Canada 
and Italy). Russia joined the group, leading to the G8 in 1998 (at least for 
economic matters).85 In 1999, partially in response to the Asian Financial 
                                                                                                                            
the law may indeed at first seem to make the law less rather than more certain for it is not 
unlike metal being tempered for a new purpose, and may have to be softened before it can 
be reshaped and hardened.”). Cf. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 
AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 551 (1993) (arguing that “the augmented role of multilateral forums in 
devising, launching, refining and promoting general international law has provided the 
international community with a more formal lawmaking process that is often used.”). Of 
course, after this re-contextualization, feedback can also help shape the original prototype 
to further improve. 
84 Peter I. Hajnal, THE G8 SYSTEM AND THE G20:  EVOLUTION, ROLE, AND 
DOCUMENTATION 12 (Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2007)  
85 Id. at 28. In terms of economic matter discussed the group dealt with issues such as 
exchange rates and balance of payments. See, e.g., Declaration of Rambouillet, Nov. 17, 
1975, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1975rambouillet/communique.html (last visited 
Jul. 18, 2011); Announcement of the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of 
France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Plaza Accord), Sept. 
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Crisis, the G-2086 group formed to bring together finance ministers and 
central bank governors from both developed and emerging economies.87  
Notably, unlike the G7 meetings, the G-20 meetings were originally 
conducted by the “finance” ministers of the various participants, not the 
heads of state.88  The G20 structure emphasized the importance of emerging 
economies in global economic issues.89  The finance ministers and central 
bank governors would typically meet once a year.90     
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis the finance ministers and central bank 
governors had met regularly since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1999. 91  
These meetings addressed issues such as financial sector regulation and 
supervision,92 terrorist financing,93 and the reform of the Bretton Woods 
                                                                                                                            
22, 1985, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm850922.htm (last visited Jul. 18, 2011); 
Statement of the G6 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Louvre Accord), Feb. 
22, 1987, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm870222.htm (last visited Jul. 18, 2011). 
86 The members of the G-20 are:  Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union.  The European 
Union is by the rotating presidency of the European Council presidency and the European 
Central Bank.  About G-20, What is the G-20, 
http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited May 23, 2011). Additionally 
Spain and the Netherlands have attended as observers. The following organizations have 
also attended as observers:  the European Commission, the European Council. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), the United Nations, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.  
JENILEE GUEBERT, G20 RESEARCH GROUP, PLANS FOR THE THIRD G20 SUMMIT: 
PITTSBURGH 2009, 44–45 (2009) 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20plans/g20leaders090818.pdf. 
87 See G20 Home, G20.ORG, http://www.g20.org (last visited Jan. 2, 2011). 
88 See REBECCA M. NELSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE G-20 AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION: BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 (2010), 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40977.pdf. 
89 Id. at 4 (noting that emerging economies have become more “active in the 
international economy.”). 
90 About G-20, What is the G-20, supra note 86 (discussing the normal practices for 
meetings and activities). 
91 Initially the G20 started out as the G22 and was formed for a one-time meeting. It 
briefly became the G33 and finally upon the recommendation of the G7 finance ministers 
became the G20. See Hajnal, supra note 84, at 151–52; see also G-20, COMMUNIQUÉ: G-20 
FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS (1999) 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/1999/1999communique.pdf [hereinafter G-20 COMMUNIQUÉ 
1999].  Deputies met twice a year to prepare for the ministerial meeting. See Hajnal, supra 
note 84, at 1.  The G20 also organizes various technical seminars throughout the year. Id.  
The meetings are not open to the public. 
92 See G-20 COMMUNIQUÉ 1999, supra note 91. 
93 G-20, COMMUNIQUÉ: G-20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS, 
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institutions.94 An important turning point for the prominence and future of 
the G20 came with the 2008 financial crisis.  As the crisis deepened, the G7 
leaders decided to convene a “summit” of the leaders of the G20 countries. 
In 2008, George W. Bush called for the first G20 Leaders Summit to be 
held in Washington D.C.95  Since the first summit in November 2008 in 
Washington, there have been four others: London (2009), Pittsburgh (2009), 
Toronto (2010) and Seoul (2010).  The G20 leaders will begin meeting once 
annually, in the fall, beginning in France in 2011. Mexico will chair the 
G20 in 2012.”96 
The first three G20 Summits moved the group from a crisis responder to 
a premiere economic institutional forum. 97   The first summit focused on 
“short and medium term responses to the crisis”;98 the second reached 
agreement on crisis management; and the third created a “new framework to 
correct global imbalances, taking steps to address food security issues, and 
eliminating fossil fuel subsidies.”99  The third and fourth summits in 
particular solidified the G20 network as an executive coordinator of 
                                                                                                                            
(2001) http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2001/2001communique.pdf; G-20, COMMUNIQUÉ: 
MEETING OF MINISTERS AND GOVERNORS IN MELBOURNE (2006), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2006/2006communique.pdf. 
94 G20, COMMUNIQUÉ: MEETING OF FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK 
GOVERNORS (2005), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2005/2005communique.pdf.  
95 Alan S. Alexandroff & John Kirton, The Great Recession and the Emergence of the 
G-20 Leaders’ Summit, in RISING STATES, RISING INSTITUTIONS: CHALLENGES FOR 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 180 (Alan S. Alexandroff & Andrew F. Cooper eds., 2010). 
96 John Kirton, What is the G20?, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20whatisit.html (last 
visited Jul. 15, 2011). 
97 Foreign policy issues remain the purview of the G-7 and G-8. NELSON, supra note 
88, at 1. 
98 Id.  
99 See e.g., G-20, THE TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION at Preamble ¶ 9, (2010) 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_declaration_en.pdf. See also G-20, THE SEOUL 
SUMMIT DECLARATION at ¶ 51(e), (2010) 
http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf (discussing an 
enhanced food security policy) [hereinafter TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION]; see also id. 
at ¶ 58 (discussing the phase out of fossil fuel subsidies). See also Daniel Cohn-Bendit & 
Rebecca Harms, Outcome of the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh (24–25 September 2009), 
EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/outcome-of-the-
g20-summit-in-pittsburgh-24-25-september-2009-1238.html (discussing the framework for 
green and global recovery); see also G-20, LEADERS’ STATEMENT THE PITTSBURGH 
SUMMIT: SEPTEMBER 24–25 2009, ¶ 39 and Preamble ¶ 24, (2009) 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf. See 
also The G-20 Summit in Toronto: Acting on Our Global Energy and Climate Change 
Challenges, THE WHITE HOUSE, June 27, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/g-20-summit-toronto-acting-our-global-energy-and-climate-change-challenges 
(discussing the background of the Pittsburgh Summit). 
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international economic policy-making and began a process of extending its 
reach to other non-financial issue areas for sustainable development, such as 
energy policy and food security.  
Markedly, each of the Leaders’ Summits displayed the G20’s 
utilization of previously established TRNs to an incrementally increasing 
degree. The Washington Summit (2008) dealt with crisis management.100   
The leaders agreed to commit “sufficient resources” to the IMF, World 
Bank and other development banks so that they could adequately respond to 
the crisis.101 While the participants had varying views on the need for a new 
global financial architecture, they finally hammered out one version.102 The 
European view favored a more comprehensive international financial 
architecture, while the US and Canada envisioned a more gradual process of 
coordination.103 Discussion between the IMF and the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) resulted in a division of labor and the expansion of the FSF.104 
The leaders sought to stabilize the financial system, recognize the 
importance of stimulus to the economy, pledge support to “have sufficient 
resources to continue playing their role in overcoming the crisis.”105  As 
part of the new blueprint, the leaders committed to implement policies 
consistent with an array of broad yet common principles.106  The principles 
included: strengthening transparency and accountability;107 enhancing 
sound regulation;108 promoting integrity in financial markets;109 reinforcing 
                                                 
100
 See G-20, DECLARATION: SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE WORLD 
ECONOMY (2008), www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf. 
101 Id. at ¶ 7. 
102 Id. 
103 Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 95, at 181. 
104 Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy: 
Washington DC, November 15, 2008, ¶ 8, 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html [hereinafter WASHINGTON 
DECLARATION]. As Alexandroff and Kirton explained the plan was to have a lightly 
institutionalized FSF would set new standards, but the organizationally powerful IMF 
would then monitor and enforce compliance with them. Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 
95, at 183. 
105 WASHINGTON DECLARATION, supra note 104. 
106 Id. (discussing the Common Principles for Reform of Financial Markets). 
107 This mainly entails “enhancing required disclosure on complex financial products 
and ensuring complete and accurate disclosure by firms of their financial conditions. 
Incentives should be aligned to avoid excessive risk-taking.” Id.  
108 This measure is aimed at “strengthen[ing] our regulatory regimes, prudential 
oversight, and risk management, and ensure that all financial markets, products and 
participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances.” Id.  
109 This aims primarily at “bolstering investor and consumer protection, avoiding 
conflicts of interest, preventing illegal market manipulation, fraudulent activities and 
abuse, and protecting against illicit finance risks arising from non-cooperative 
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international cooperation; 110 and reforming international financial 
institutions.111  To implement these principles for reform, the leaders set out 
an action plan that contained immediate and medium-term items with more 
specificity.112 
 At the London Summit (2009), the theme of crisis management 
continued, but the group also set goals for long-term planning and policy 
coordination.113  Given the more long-term view on this summit, it is not 
surprising that some divergence in policy perspectives and priorities 
emerged. For example, the U.S. focused its attention more on stimulus 
while the EU sought better global regulation.114  Emerging powers sought 
progress on “trade openness, trade finance, development, and reform of 
international financial institutions.” 115 Still other powers, including the UK, 
broached the subject of adding climate change to the talks.116   
                                                                                                                            
jurisdictions.” Id.  
110 This will facilitate “coordination and cooperation across all segments of financial 
markets, including with respect to cross-border capital flows.” Id. 
111 The goal is to “reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions so that they can more 
adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy in order to increase 
their legitimacy and effectiveness. [E]merging and developing economies, including the 
poorest countries, should have greater voice and representation.” Id. 
112 See generally id. 
113 G-20 LEADERS, THE GLOBAL PLAN FOR RECOVERY AND REFORM, ¶¶ 2, 4 (2009), 
http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx [hereinafter Recovery and Reform].  
114 Rich Miller & Simon Kennedy, G-20 Shapes New World Order With Lesser Role 
for U.S Markets, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 2, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=axEnb_LXw5yc&refer=ho
me (discussing the U.S. taking the lead in getting the summit to agree on an increase in 
IMF rescue funds to $750 billion from $250 billion now); Associated Foreign Press, G20 
Needs to Act: Action on Global Financial Crisis: Analysts, WATODAY (Austl.), Apr. 1, 
2009, http://www.watoday.com.au/world/g20-needs-to-act-action-on-global-financial-
crisis-analysts-20090401-9jor.html (discussing the divide between United States and 
Europe); Steve Richards, Woolly Words Expose Weakness of Leaders' Convictions, INDEP., 
Apr. 2, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/steve-richards/steve-
richards-woolly-words-expose-weakness-of- leaders-conviction s-1659990.html 
(discussing Brown's and Obama's uncertainties going into the summit); José Barrosco, EU 
Commission President, Declaration on the preparation of the G20 Summit, (Mar. 24, 2009) 
(transcript available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8601_en.htm) 
(Illustrating EU’ s urging for a Global Response). 
115 Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 95, at 185; Lee Hudson Teslik, Council on 
Foreign Relations: 20 Agendas at G-20, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18997/twenty_agendas_at_g20.html (last visited Jul. 14, 
2011). 
116 GORDON BROWN, THE UK CABINET OFFICE, SUPPORTING GLOBAL GROWTH: A 
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE RESPONSIVENESS AND ADAPTABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 5, 7 (2009),   
http://www.g20.org/Documents/cabinet_office_supporting_global_growth_0909.pdf  
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 Despite these divides, the summit was a success because the G20s 
maintained its role as an executive coordinator and orchestrated a response 
to the crisis.117  The leaders laid a framework or blueprint for the various 
sector-specific networks, such as banking and securities networks, to follow 
as they develop more specific regulatory prototypes with which to achieve 
corresponding regulatory goals. For example, the leaders facilitated the 
operation of a financial network by creating the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) as the successor to the Financial Stability forum (FSF).118 The FSB 
was asked to partner with the IMF as a monitoring entity.119 The G20 also 
agreed to increase funding for the IMF.120   It endorsed the OECD efforts to 
“take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions including tax havens.”121  
It again called on accounting bodies to coordinate with supervisors and 
regulators to improve standards.122 Furthermore, the London Summit 
committed to concluding the Doha Round,123 a commitment which the G20 
later backed off,124reasserted125 and then reaffirmed.126  It also reaffirmed 
                                                                                                                            
(discussing climate change). 
117 See Prime Minister Hails Success of G–20 London Summit, 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2507 (last visited Jul. 6, 2011); Obama Hails London 
Summit as Start of Economic Turnaround, CBC NEWS, Apr. 2, 2009, 
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/04/02/g20-obama.html; ERIC HELLEINER & PAOLA 
SUBACCHI, THE CENTER FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, FROM LONDON TO 
L’AQUILA: BUILDING A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE G20 AND THE G8 (2009), 
http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/CH%20London%20to%20Laquila%20WEB.p
df.  
118 Recovery and Reform, supra note 113, at ¶ 15; History of Financial Stability Board, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (last visited Jul. 6, 2011) 
[hereinafter HISTORY OF FSB]. 
119 Recovery and Reform, supra note 118; HISTORY OF FSB, supra note 118. 
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 Recovery and Reform, supra note 118, at ¶ 23; HISTORY OF FSB, supra note 118. 
The Leaders saw the importance of not only confronting the present crisis but of 
forestalling protectionist policies that could worsen it.  At the London Summit the G20 
asked the WTO along with UNCTAD and the OECD to “monitor and report publicly on 
G20 adherence to their undertakings on resisting protectionism and promoting global trade 
and investment.” See OECD, WTO, UNCTAD, REPORT ON G20 TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
MEASURES 3 (2009), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wto_oecd_unctad2009_en.pdf; 
OECD, WTO, UNCTAD, Report on G20 Trade and Investment (Sept. 2009 to Feb. 2010), 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wto_oecd_unctad2010d1_en.pdf. 
124 THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE: MDG 
GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 31 (2010), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/mdg_gap2010/mdg8report2010_
engw.pdf (“the goal set by the G-20 to conclude the negotiations in 2010 appears 
unrealizable, and no new deadline has been set.”). 
125 TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99, at ¶ 38. 
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the commitment to reach the Millennium Development Goals127and to work 
towards a successful plan to cope with climate change.128   
The Progress Report following the London Summit attests to the 
G20 efforts to harness the resources of various TRNs. With the ongoing 
prompting and guidance of the G20, these networks kept generating various 
regulatory prototypes. For example, the BCBS issued Final Capital 
Requirements Standards for Re-securitizations and Enhanced Risk 
Management Requirements around Structured Products and Off-balance 
Sheet Activities.129  IOSCO published Interim Recommendations about 
Regulatory Approaches to Be Implemented in the Securitization Markets.130  
Subsequently, IOSCO finalized its Report on Good Practices in relation to 
Investment Managers Due Diligence when investing in Structured Finance 
Instruments.131  
Motivated by the success of the London Summit, the Pittsburgh 
Summit (2009) revealed even more ambitious blueprints.132  The leaders 
officially ordained the G20 as the premier forum for international economic 
coordination.133  They stressed the importance of increasing the 
representation of emerging-market countries at the IMF,134 as well as 
specific commitment on a host of new policy areas, including economic 
development and the environment.135  In addition to reforming the IMF, the 
Summit announced plans for reform of the development banks. Specifically, 
the G20 called upon the World Bank to strengthen its focus on food 
security, human development, economic growth for the poor; and financing 
a green economy.136   The emphasis of the Leaders’ Statement was on 
forward-looking sustainable development, launching the Framework for 
                                                                                                                            
126 THE SEOUL SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99, at ¶ 43. 
127 Recovery and Reform, supra note 113, at ¶ 25. 
128 Id. at ¶ 28. 
129 G-20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIONS OF THE LONDON AND WASHINGTON G20 
SUMMITS, ¶ 48 (2009), 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/20090905_G20_progress_update_London_Fin_Mins_final
.pdf [hereinafter LONDON AND WASHINGTON PROGRESS REPORT]. 
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
132 The Leaders announced the summit as turning the page “on the era of 
irresponsibility.”  LEADERS STATEMENT, THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, at Preamble, ¶ 1 
(2009), http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf 
[hereinafter THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT]. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at ¶ 1, 20. 
135 See, e.g., id. at Annex ¶ 5. 
136 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 24–29. 
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Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth.137 In ushering in these ambitious 
blueprints, the G20 leaders attempted to coordinate, cross-link, and micro-
manage various networks and entities.  For example, leaders  
 
asked the IMF to assist our Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors in this process of mutual assessment by 
developing a forward-looking analysis of whether policies 
pursued by individual G-20 countries are collectively 
consistent with more sustainable and balanced trajectories 
for the global economy, and to report regularly to both the 
G-20 and the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee (IMFC), building on the IMF’s existing bilateral 
and multilateral surveillance analysis, on global economic 
developments, patterns of growth and suggested policy 
adjustments. Our Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors will elaborate this process at their November 
meeting and we will review the results of the first mutual 
assessment at our next summit. 138 
 
With respect to its efforts on energy and sustainable development, 
G20 tapped into preexisting entities.  “We request relevant institutions, such 
as the IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank, provide an analysis of the 
scope of energy subsidies and suggestions for the implementation of this 
initiative and report back at the next summit.” 139   
The G20 progress reports play an important role in “monitoring” 
and moving blueprints forward.  The Progress Reports closely detail the 
work of BCBS, the FSB, the finance ministers, IAIS, IOSCO, IASB, and 
the BIS among others.140  For example, the Progress report notes the 
pressing need for supervision and monitoring to combat systemic risk by 
nearly every network. 141  It chronicles various TRN efforts, such as the 
IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (recognizing 
the need to confront systemic risk); the BCBS’ investigation of systemic 
funding liquidity risks; the FSB and IMF’s monitoring of data gaps, and the 
IAIS beginning investigation of systemic risks. 142 
The Toronto Summit (2010) re-affirmed the G20’s role as a premier 
                                                 
137 Id. at ¶ 5. 
138
Id. at Annex page 6 at ¶ 6. 
139 Id. at Annex page 14 at ¶ 30. 
140 See, e.g., LONDON AND WASHINGTON PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 129, at ¶¶  65, 
71, 82–88.   
141 Id. at 65. 
142 Id.  
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forum for international economic cooperation.143  By accepting the 
recommendations from Labor and Employment Ministers who had met in 
April,144 the G20 demonstrated that it did factor in social implications of 
economic growth and development. It also marked the completion of peer 
review mechanism, the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP),145 under which 
the G20 can collectively evaluate each member’s record of compliance with 
previous blueprints and regulatory prototypes.  Relying upon IMF and 
World Bank assessment, the leaders suggested that a more ambitious plan 
would result in a speedier, more sustainable, and more equitable 
recovery.146 Leaders agreed to at least halve deficits by 2013 and stabilize 
or reduce government debt to GDP ratios by 2016.”147  
The evaluation on the Seoul Summit (2010) has been mixed.  One of 
the pressing issues facing the leaders was currency imbalances and the 
summit failed to deliver a solution, although it did pledge to develop 
indicative guidelines to address global imbalances.148  Nonetheless, some 
have noted that the summit eased tensions amongst countries over 
quantitative easing and currency devaluation.149  Given the incremental 
nature of the G20 operation, one might not be too disappointed with these 
efforts.  Moreover, there were some more concrete accomplishments that 
built upon prior work.150  In particular, the Summit officially endorsed 
Basel III and emphasized the continued importance of macro-prudential 
                                                 
143 TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99, at ¶ 1. 
144 Id., at ¶ 5. 
145  See Factsheet: The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process, International Monetary 
Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm (last visited Jul 15, 2011). 
146 TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99, at ¶ 9. 
147 Id., at ¶ 10. 
148 See generally Laurence Norman and Ian Talley, No deal: Seoul’s G20 summit fails 
to deliver on currencies, trade imbalances, THE AUSTRALIAN, November 12, 2010, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/markets/no-deal-seouls-g20-summit-fails-to-
deliver-on-currencies-trade-imbalances/story-e6frg926-1225952694281; and G20 Summit: 
No accord on ‘currency values’ or imbalances, 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2010/244/econ1.htm (last visited June 3, 2011) 
(discussing how the 11-12 November Seoul Summit was unable to establish a solution to 
the differences on currency values or global imbalances but agreed to develop guidelines). 
149
See G20 Agree to Move toward more Market-driven Exchange Rate, 
http://english.cri.cn/6826/2010/11/12/2741s604727.htm (last visited June 4, 2011) (noting 
that the Seoul Summit was held amid tensions among G20 nations on several issues, but 
the nations were able to find a medium on many controversial issues). 
150 Preparations for the G20 Seoul Summit in November and its Agenda, KOREA IT 
TIMES, May 10, 2010, http://www.koreaittimes.com/story/8713/preparations-g20-seoul-
summit-november-and-its-agenda (discussing the agenda for the G20 Seoul Summit and 
noting that 60% to 70% of the agenda built off the agendas from prior summit meetings). 
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frameworks such at the IMF’s MAP.151  
The Seoul Summit perhaps best highlights the successes and 
limitations of the G20 in coordinating the many diverse networks at its 
disposal.  True, the G20 was instrumental in merging its political will and 
breadth during times of crisis.  At the same time, however, the networks at 
its disposal act incrementally as they build upon a history of work and 
relevant epistemic communities.  As the crisis has subsided, efforts to 
coordinate beyond the exigency tend to face greater political hurdles.152 
                                                 
151 See Did the G20 Lose its Seoul?, SEEKING ALPHA, November 21, 2010, 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/237890-did-the-g20-lose-its-seoul (highlighting the role of 
the G20 at the Seoul Summit and its endorsement of Basel III and restructuring of IMF). 
See also The Basel iii Accord: The new Basel iii framework, http://www.basel-iii-
accord.com/ (last visited June 3, 2011) (noting that the G20 leaders officially endorsed the 
Basel III framework at the November 2010 Seoul Summit); and John Lipsky, The Post-
Summit Prospects for Policy Cooperation, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/112310.htm (last visited June 3, 2011) 
(discussing that the G20 Leaders affirmed the importance of MAP at the Seoul Summit). 
152 Roya Wolverson, G20’s Tepid Economic Reform, COUNS. ON FOREIGN REL., Oct. 
25, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/economics/g20s-tepid-economic-reform/p23218 (“The G20 
finance meeting this weekend in Gyeongju, South Korea, failed to produce concrete 
measures to tame worsening trade and currency imbalances . . .”); Paul Krugmann, The 
Third Depression, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/opinion/28krugman.html?scp=7&sq=g20%20failure
&st=cse (“[M]ost recently at last weekend’s deeply discouraging G-20 meeting — 
governments are obsessing about inflation when the real threat is deflation, preaching the 
need for belt-tightening when the real problem is inadequate spending.”); Simon Johnson, 
Capital Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/capital-
failure/?scp=1&sq=g20%20failure&st=cse (“The Group of 20 has completely failed to do 
what is necessary to rein in global megabanks — and to make them safer.”); Anat Admati, 
Healthy Banking System is the Goal, Not Profitable Banks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, 
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/admatiFTletter11.09.10.pdf (“Basel III bank 
regulation proposals that Group of 20 leaders will discuss fail to eliminate key structural 
flaws in the current system.”); Stiglitz Criticizes Multiple Shortcomings of the G20 Agenda, 
INT’L FIN. INST. IN LATIN AMERICA, Sep. 29, 2009, 
http://ifis.choike.org/informes/1111.html (“The fact that the G20 allocated its funds almost 
entirely to the IMF means in part that the world does not yet have the right kind of 
institutions for effective crisis response”); Anders Aslung, The Group of 20 Must be 
Stopped, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/37deaeb4-dad0-11de-
933d-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1PU5zsLUi (“[T]he G20 actually violates fundamental 
principles of international co-operation by arrogating for itself important financial 
decisions that should be shared by all countries. In so doing it also emasculates the 
sovereign rights of small countries that have long been the prime defenders of 
multilateralism and international law as well as the foremost policy innovators.”); Hans 
Debowski, Criticism of g20 Crisis Management, D+C, Feb. 2009, 
http://www.inwent.org/ez/articles/087261/index.en.shtml (“Robert Zoellick, the president 
of the World Bank, bemoaned that, instead of safeguarding free trade as promised in 
PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR 
36 NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE  [9-Aug-11 
 
Therefore, while the G20 still proceeds to administer a host of networks as 
they develop norms and often gel into legal standards, the kind of political 
impetus characterizing the G20’s initial success appears to wane. As long as 
the G20 remains a political, and indeed diplomatic, entity as an “Executive 
Coordinator” amongst different networks,153 the G2o might have to live 
with the disappointment derived from a mismatch between professionalism 
and politics.  
 
B.  Networks at Play  
 
The G20’s coordinated response to the global financial crisis 
provides a rich opportunity to analyze sophisticated network dynamics. 
Like-minded regulators from different governments in sector specific TRNs 
display these dynamics while working towards goals set by the G20.  At the 
same time, since any TRN may contain more than one sub-network, such as 
the BCBS as a sub-network in the Banking Network, the G20’s 
coordination efforts within each network are vital. As discussed above, the 
evolution of the G20 into a premier international economic forum tracks the 
increasing manifestation of its coordination efforts to guide, facilitate and 
even balance these intra-network dynamics.  
 
1. The Banking Network 
 
The most prominent TRN that the G20’s Leader Summit coordinates 
is the Banking Network. The G20 mobilized the pre-existing banking 
networks already operating at the FSB, the IMF and the BCBS. The G20 
linked them altogether to build a larger, more capable TRN.  It then directed 
the network’s activities in the financial crisis of 2008.  
The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors formally 
established the Banking Network in 1999 at its ministerial. While the 
ministerial involves finance ministers and central bank governors, lower 
level officials meet prior to ministerial to begin negotiations, work on 
logistics and technical matters.154  Much work goes on prior to ministerial 
meetings including “two deputies meetings each year as well as extensive 
technical work, including an array of workshops, reports and case studies on 
                                                                                                                            
November, some G20 members had taken protectionist steps. . . .”). 
153 Claire R. Kelly, Financial Crises and Civil Society, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 505 (2011); 
see also Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 95, at 193 (referring to the group as an “implicit 
global executive committee.”).  
154 NELSON, supra note 88, at 7.  
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specific subjects.”155 There are also meetings amongst “sherpas,” who are 
the personal representatives of the ministers and they meet both prior to and 
following the summits to attend to the details of the proposals for and the 
conclusions of the summits.   
The FSB, while part of the Banking Network could be considered a 
core coordinator amongst various financial networks within the G20, 
including the securities and insurance networks, but especially within the 
banking network. In the 2008 crisis the G20 instructed the FSB to take 
charge of the coordination of exit strategies,156 as well as surveillance.157 
The Banking Network also encompasses the World Bank158 and the IMF, as 
both institutions employ the networks of national finance ministers and 
                                                 
155 Id. 
156 MICHAEL CROWLEY, THE PEW ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT, G-20 
BACKGROUND NOTE 4 (2009), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/policy%20page/G-20-Note-
Final.pdf. 
157 LONDON AND WASHINGTON PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 129, at ¶ 33. The 
membership of the FSB is all G-20 countries, the former Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 
members, Spain and the European Commission.  The FSF preceded the FSB and was itself 
preceded by the “Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates.” SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 
135. The actual members are the central bank governors and finance ministers from 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of 
America. Financial Stability Board, Links to FSB Members, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm (last visited Jul. 17, 2011). Also, 
the following organizations take part in the operation of the FSB: IOSCO, the Basel 
Committee, the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank, the 
European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-ordination and Development, the World Bank, the Committee on the Global Financial 
System, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors, and the International Accounting Standards Board. 
158 The World Bank consists of five institutions: The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”), the International Development Association 
(IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). For a complete description of these five institutions see THE WORLD BANK, A 
GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK 10–23 (2003). It provides loans to developing countries 
fostering economic and social development. Articles of Agreement of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944, Art. I, § (i), 60 Stat. 1440, 2 
U.N.T.S. 134, amended 16 U.S.T. 1942, 606 U.N.T.S. 294.; Articles of Agreement of the 
International Development Association, Preamble, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249 
(entered into force Sept. 24, 1960). See The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org 
(follow “About” hyperlink; then follow “Articles of Agreement” hyperlink under “Key 
Resources”) (last visited Jul. 17, 2011). Member countries fund it through the purchase of 
capital stock.   
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central bankers.159 The World Bank funds various projects in developing 
countries, such as “education, health, public administration, infrastructure, 
financial and private sector development, agriculture and environmental and 
natural resource management.”160 It also enforces certain principles and 
standards by conditioning the provision of those resources on the 
implementation of those principles and standards.161  
The IMF carries out the G20’s action plans in the area of banking 
regulation mainly due to its expertise. The IMF facilitates global monetary 
cooperation using three tools:162 economic surveillance, technical 
assistance, and lending.163  First, the IMF monitors the economic health of 
member countries, alerting them to potential risks.  Through its system of 
“bilateral surveillance,”164 it annually evaluates all 186 of its member 
countries and then discusses with that country “whether there are risks to 
the economy’s domestic and external stability that would argue for 
adjustments in economic or financial policies.”165 It may also engage in 
multilateral consultations involving global stability issues.166  Its technical 
assistance focuses on a variety of topics including “fiscal policy, monetary 
and exchange rate policies, banking and financial system supervision and 
regulation, and statistics.”167 It also lends to countries in financial crisis.  
For example, the IMF recently loaned the Ukraine 16 billion dollars to aid 
its banking industry.168 It has also coordinated with the FSB to explore gaps 
                                                 
159 Anne Marie Slaughter points out that their weighted voted mechanisms elevate 
them somewhat as a distinct entity rather than merely a forum for a network. SLAUGHTER, 
supra note 2, at 22. 
160 The World Bank, About Us, See The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org 
(follow “About” hyperlink) (last visited Jul. 17, 2011).  
161 See Stiglitz, supra note 152, at 75. 
162 See International Monetary Fund (IMF), Our Work, 
http://www.imf.org/external/about/ourwork.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). 
163 Carlo Gola & Francesco Spadafora , Financial Sector Surveillance and the IMF 3 
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 247 2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09247.pdf. 
164 Id.; see also IMF, THE 2007 SURVEILLANCE DECISION: REVISED OPERATIONAL 
GUIDANCE 9 (2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/062209.pdf.  
165 IMF, How We Do It, http://www.imf.org/external/about/howwedo.htm (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2010). 
166 David Robinson, IMF-Backed Plan to Cut Global Imbalances, IMF, Aug. 7, 2007, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/SurveyartA.htm. 
167 IMF, How we do it, supra note 165. 
168 IMF To Loan Ukraine Billions To Cope With Global Crisis, RADIO FREE EUR. 
RADIO LIBERTY, Mar. 24, 2010, 
http://www.rferl.org/Content/IMF_To_Loan_Ukraine_Billions_To_Cope_With_Global 
_Crisis/1335307.html; Press Release, IMF, IMF Completes Second Review Under Stand-
By Arrangement with Ukraine and Approves US$3.3 Billion Disbursement (Jul. 28, 2009).   
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in data collection at the direction of the G20.169    
 Another crucial pillar of the Banking Network is the BCBS 
comprised of the central bank governors from 27 countries.170 Housed in the 
Bank for International Settlements, the BCBS “generates global public 
goods of information and expertise”171 in the area of banking supervision. It 
drafts a variety of technical regulatory prototypes relating to capital 
adequacy and liquidity requirements of banks.172 These regulatory 
prototypes, while non-binding in a formal legal sense, are highly respected 
due to the BCBS’s professional legitimacy.  The G20 has invoked the 
BCBS’s competence and reputation and assigned several roles in its action 
plans.173  
The G20 has orchestrated these components of the Banking Network 
to produce both frameworks and more definite regulatory prototypes in its 
characteristically incremental manner.  For example, in implementing the 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, the G20 first 
tasked the IMF and the World Bank with a reporting function in the Finance 
Ministers’ Meeting at St. Andrews, Scotland in November 2009.174  The 
Framework specified that the IMF must analyze how countries’ “respective 
                                                 
169 See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND INFORMATION GAPS, REPORT TO THE G20 FINANCE 
MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS (2009) 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102909.pdf. 
170 Bank for International Settlements, Basel II and Revisions to the Capital 
Requirements Directive, http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100503.htm (last visited June 6, 
2011) (discussing the impact, calibration, and implementation of the BCBS). 
171 Michael S. Barr & Jeffrey P. Miller, Global Administration Law: The View from 
Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 23 (2006). 
172 See Bank for International Settlements, About the Basel Committee, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited June 5, 2011) (noting that the BCBS develops 
guidelines and supervisory standards for banks, including standards on capital adequacy). 
173
 See G20, DECLARATION SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE WORLD 
ECONOMY (2008) http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf (discussing 
that the BCBS “should study the need for and help develop firms’ new stress testing 
models, as appropriate”); see also G20, DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM—LONDON (2009) 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf 
(discussing the role of the BCBS in compensation and its position to strengthen 
international cooperation and international frameworks for prudential regulation); see also 
LEADERS’ STATEMENT THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 99 (highlighting a way to 
strengthen the international financial regulatory system by building high quality capital and 
mitigating pro-cyclicality).  
174 G-20, COMMUNIQUÉ: MEETING OF FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK 
GOVERNORS, ¶ 3 (2010) http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20finance100423.html. It has 
also partnered in the G-20 Pittsburgh summit commitment to reduce fossil fuel energy 
subsidies. See LEADERS’ STATEMENT THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 99. 
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national or regional policy frameworks fit together.”175  The World Bank 
had been asked to report of development and poverty reduction.176  The 
Framework also initiated a new “mutual assessment” process and 
constructed a detailed timetable for its operation.177 Subsequently at the 
Leaders Meeting in Toronto, Canada in June of 2010, G20 reviewed the 
policy proposal prepared by the IMF and moved forward on a consultative 
mutual assessment process.  As part of this process they developed a basket 
of policy options to achieve stronger, more sustainable and more balanced 
growth.”178  Of course, the G20’s executive coordination reaches beyond 
the blueprint level: it also generates more concrete regulatory prototypes, 
such as the Basel III.  
 The development of Basel III eloquently demonstrates how the G20 
coordinated the banking network to produce a regulatory prototype. The 
G20 Summit in Washington DC in November 2008 issued the “Washington 
Action Plan.” In the Plan, G20 leaders instructed the IMF and the expanded 
FSF to develop “recommendations,” which would eventually evolve into a 
new regulatory prototype on bank capital.179 Upon the instruction, the FSF 
and its members immediately focused on the bank capital adequacy ratio. 
The G20 Leaders also agreed that the BCBS would provide new guidelines 
for harmonized capital requirements by the end of 2009.180  
 Admittedly, the BCBS’s role in capital adequacy started long before 
the 2008 crisis.  To understand the role of capital adequacy standards one 
must remember that when a highly leveraged firm suffers a loss, creditors 
tend to withdraw funding which might require the firm to sell off assets 
which may precipitate further losses.181  If other firms are counterparties or 
hold similar assets, a more systemic risk arises and capital dries up.  
Regulators who prefer greater capital requirements see these capital 
requirements as buffers against such loses that might precipitate a crisis.   
 Prior to the 2008 crisis the BCBS has developed Basel I and Basel 
II.  Both Basel I and Basel II provided capital buffers, yet failed to prevent 
the 2008 crisis. 182 Some have suggested that the failure of Basel I and Basel 
                                                 
175 LEADERS’ STATEMENT THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 99. 
176  Id. 
177 Id. 
178 TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99. 
179 G-20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIONS OF THE WASHINGTON ACTION PLAN 
(2009), http://www.g20.org/Documents/FINAL_Annex_on_Action_Plan.pdf [hereinafter 
WASHINGTON ACTION PLAN]. 
180 Id. 
181 REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE 
OF GLOBAL FINANCE 143 (Viral A. Acharya, et al. eds., 2011). 
182 Id. 
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II can be traced to the fact that in each the needed buffer was tied to an 
individual firm and not the systemic relationship amongst firms. 183  
Moreover, a buffer, which some would suggest only provides a second best 
solution, might be either too costly or ineffective.184  The first best solution 
they would argue is to internalize the cost of risk.185  Basel III, arguably 
merely tinkers with the model established in Basel I and Basel II.  It does 
not internalize the cost of risk, and indeed some would contend that Basel 
III encourages firms to avoid its strictures by seeking a shadow banking 
regime, which tends to create risk. 186   Thus, at first glance Basel III 
appears to be one of the failings of intra-network dynamics.  The process 
can be insular and limiting.  The virtue of empathetic sympathization that 
brings network actors together also may stop them from taking a step back 
to see the failures of their actions.  If one starts with a failed product the 
outgrowth of future intra-network dynamics will arguably be more failure.  
Thus, the network dynamics involved in Basel III might lead to more, not 
less, failure (if one views of Basel I and Basel II as flawed products). 
 Apart from the controversial merits, or demerits, of Basel III, it is 
still worth examining the developments leading to Basel III to fully evaluate 
the G20’s coordination efforts as well as the intra-network dynamism.  The 
BCBS’s goal for Basel III was to better hedge against systemic loses by 
                                                 
183 Id. 
184 WSBI-ESBC, POSITION REGARDING THE BASEL CONSULTATION ON A 




(“An inappropriate level of regulatory requirements (i.e. too low or too high capital 
buffers) might prove to be either inefficient or excessively expensive”; “Because capital is 
costly and because investors in times of crisis are looking for secure investments, we 
believe that there is a risk that the proposed buffers would turn into a set of new minimum 
requirements thereby missing the initial objective.”); BUILDING SOC’Y ASS’N, OUR 
RESPONSE TO TWO BASEL COMMITTEE CONSULTATIONS: STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE 
OF THE BANKING SECTOR (CP 164) AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK 
MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS AND MONITORING  (CP165) 5 (2010), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/tbsa.pdf  (“Another unintended consequence of too costly 
liquidity requirements will be to push banks into higher risk business to compensate for 
holding low margin, or unprofitable assets, clearly not the intention of the proposed 
rules.”); BUILDING SOC’Y ASS’N, Independent Commission on Banking: Call for Evidence 
2 (2010), http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/Building-Society-Association-Issues-Paper-Response.pdf   
(“Overall, the Commission must decide what it is trying to optimize, or whether some sort 
of second best solution, for example relying on capital buffers, is sufficient.”). 
185 Regulating Wall Street, supra note 181, at 153.  
186 Id. at 144. 
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providing for greater capital requirements, enhanced liquidity, and 
countercyclical buffers.187  Still, disagreements arose over what was meant 
by capital and how stringent the requirements needed to be.188  The G20 
prodded the BCBS along.  By the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, 
the G20 members agreed that a major form of Tier 1 capital must be 
“common shares and retained earnings.”189 They also agreed to develop 
separate rules for “non-joint stock companies” so that these companies 
could hold equivalent levels of high quality Tier 1 capital. The G20 then 
instructed the BCBS to issue concrete proposals by the end of 2009, 
conduct an impact assessment at the beginning of 2010 and complete the 
task by the end of 2010. 
 The making of the new bank capital requirements intensified after 
the G20 Pittsburgh Summit. By the G20 Toronto Meeting in June 2010, the 
BCBS had undertaken a comprehensive “bottom-up” quantitative impact 
assessment as well as a detailed “top-down” macroeconomic impact 
assessment on the bank capital requirements.190 Meanwhile, the guidelines 
for bank capital harmonization took solid shape: a considerably higher share 
of Tier 1 capital had to be “common equity”; the rest of Tier 1 capital base 
had to include those instruments “that are subordinated, have fully 
discretionary non-cumulative dividends or coupons and neither have a 
maturity date nor an incentive to redeem”; any “innovative hybrid capital 
instruments” had to be phased out; Tier 2 capital base had to be 
harmonized; Tier 3 capital instruments to cover market risks had to be 
eliminated.   In September 2010, the BCBS finally announced its new 
capital requirements, Basel III, which established a 7% of a minimum 
                                                 
187 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS, (2010), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (discussing erosion of quality of capital which led to 
2007 financial crisis and listing Basel Committee’s goals for Basel III). 
188 IFAM Group, Basel III, http://www.ifamgroup.com/basel-iii/ (last visited Jul. 15, 
2011) (”[T]he industry argues that the committee is going overboard in many areas and 
doing so in ways that will significantly, and unnecessarily, raise the cost of providing loans 
and other banking services. . .Banks in every country gain considerable benefit from at 
least one of the balance sheet items that will no longer count as capital and therefore put 
forth arguments as to why they should continue to count. . . .”). 
189 G20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIONS TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
REFORM ISSUED BY THE U.S. CHAIR OF THE PITTSBURG G-20 SUMMIT (2009), 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_progress_report_250909.pdf.  
190 G20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ACTIONS OF THE 
LONDON, WASHINGTON AND PITTSBURGH G20 SUMMITS PREPARED BY KOREA, CHAIR OF 
THE G20 (2010), 
http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/07/July_2010_G20_Progress_Grid.pdf [hereinafter 
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS].  
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common equity requirement as well as an additional counter-cyclical buffer 
including up to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. The G20 members endorsed 
the Basel III at the Seoul Summit in November 2010.  Notably at the same 
time the G20 leaders and the banking network encouraged States to 
implement Basel II.191 
Basel III required several points of position-shifting and 
reconciliation where we could expect to see intra-network dynamics at 
work.  First, reports indicate that German and French officials led concerns 
that the Basel III standards would be too stringent and require 
implementation too quickly.192 One proposal attributed to the US and the 
UK was to compromise of the scope of the standards by tinkering with the 
definition of “capital,” to specifically exclude minority interests of financial 
institutions held by banks.193  Indeed, some saw the willingness of the US 
and UK to be persuaded as evidence of their belief in the global approach 
and the legitimacy that had been invested in it. 194 Further, while the Basel 
III timetable has been criticized as too long, some have pointed to the need 
to compromise on this issue due to the state of the recovery in some 
countries as well as the need to restructure on behalf of some (particularly 
European) banks given the new capital definitions.195  Some issues, such as 
whether and how to recognize new capital instruments,196 and the 
establishment of buffers,197 remained unresolved.  These unresolved issues 
represent the limit of G20’s coordination, at least at this moment.198  
                                                 
191 Letter from Michel Pébereau & Clemens Börsig, members of European Financial 
Services Round Table, to Christine Lagarde, Minister of Finance in France (Feb. 16, 2011) 
(available at 
http://www.efr.be/documents/news/75.2011.02.%20EFR%20Letter%20to%20G20%20Fin
ance%20Minister%20Lagarde%2016.02.2011.pdf) (urging G20 Commitment to implement 
Basel II and III); see also THE SEOUL SUMMIT DECLARATION, supra note 99. 
192 Yalman Onaran & Simon Clark, European Banks Poised to Win Reprieve in Basel 




195 Basel III Standards for Banks’ Capital and Liquidity is on Track, GLG RESEARCH, 
Oct. 9, 2010, http://www.glgroup.com/News/Basel-III-standards-for-banks-capital-and-
liquidity-is-on-track-50915.html. 
196 Id.  See also BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PROPOSAL TO ENSURE 
THE LOSS ABSORBENCY OF REGULATORY CAPITAL AT THE POINT OF NON VIABILITY, 
(2010) http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf. 
197 See Basel III Standards for Banks’ Capital and Liquidity is on Track, supra note 
195. 
198 See e.g., Wolverson, supra note 152 (“The G20 finance meeting this weekend in 
Gyeongju, South Korea, failed to produce concrete measures to tame worsening trade and 
currency imbalances. . . .”); Paul Krugmann, The Third Depression, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
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At the same time, the incremental formation of Basel III also offers 
an excellent avenue in locating the intra-network dynamics leading up to 
this regulatory prototype created by the Banking Network. First of all, the 
network collaboration in this highly professional area would not have been 
possible without the widely shared, if not uniform, professional grounds 
among network participants. Government officials from different countries’ 
Finance Ministries and Central Banks spoke the similar, if not identical, 
language, similar enough to communicate with each other. They understand 
what the terms “Tier I capital” and “risk capture” mean. This expert 
sympathization among network participants expands any otherwise local 
regulatory dialogue into a multilateral horizon so that like-minded 
regulators can collaborate on the eventual formulation of a regulatory 
product, such as Basel III.  
Admittedly, not every dialogue leads to consensus or convergence. 
There may be disagreements on a number of issues at a professional level. 
To narrow the gap of these disagreements among them, some participants 
attempt to “persuade” other members to accept their positions. When this 
attempt to persuade occurs simultaneously from both directions, two parties 
engage in a “negotiation.” In the Banking Network, Franco-German 
regulators persuaded the U.S. and UK counterparts to exclude minority 
interests of financial institutions held by banks from the definition of 
“capital.” In return, the U.S. and the UK regulators could persuade their 
European counterparts to accept Basel III despite the latter’s concern for 
implementation due to the new capital definition.199 
Unsurprisingly, developing countries played a relatively small role, 
if at all, in the establishment of Basel III mainly due to their limited 
influence in this area. Nonetheless, they decided to remain engaged to 
preserve their actor momentum in the network. This is a good example of 
                                                                                                                            
2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/opinion/28krugman.html?scp=7&sq=g20%20failure
&st=cse (“[M]ost recently at last weekend’s deeply discouraging G-20 meeting—
governments are obsessing about inflation when the real threat is deflation, preaching the 
need for belt-tightening when the real problem is inadequate spending.”); Simon Johnson, 
Capital Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/capital-
failure/?scp=1&sq=g20%20failure&st=cse (“The Group of 20 has completely failed to do 
what is necessary to rein in global megabanks—and to make them safer.”); Admati, supra 
note 152 (“Basel III bank regulation proposals that Group of 20 leaders will discuss fail to 
eliminate key structural flaws in the current system.”). 
199 See Elena Logutenkova & Fabio Benedetti-Valentini, BNP Grows to Biggest Bank 
as France Says Size Doesn’t Matter, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 4, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-03/bnp-grows-to-biggest-bank-as-france-says-
size-doesn-t-matter.html. 
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willing marginalization. 
Finally, most participants engaged in deliberation on Basel III 
despite the fact that they could not resolve all the issues on the table. Some 
issues remain unresolved. Nonetheless, network participants understood the 
incremental nature of this network operation and could hammer out a 
modest yet still desirable outcome. The G20 network process over the Basel 
III typifies “responsive engagement” in that it signifies that the network 
participants are still willing to negotiate, at least on some issues, even if 
they may fail to conclude on others at present. Such responsive engagement 
is vital in preserving momentum in regulatory dialogue regardless of any 
immediate regulatory end product. In sum, their understanding of 
responsive engagement enabled the network operation to move forward. 
Possibly, these same participants may produce Basel IV or V later on as 
their networking continues.  
 In sum, to deliver a new regulatory prototype (such as the Basel III) 
the G20 choreographed various component networks, such as the IMF and 
the BCBS, in a way which the TRN could be geared toward a collective 
goal. Here, the G20, as an executive coordinator, was able to mobilize its 
unique political capital in orchestrating these components, generate various 
regulatory prototypes, and eventually confirm them.  At the same time, 
however, due to a largely self-referential nature of intra-network dynamics 
the Banking Network operation may still be insular and unresponsive to 
external debates or criticisms on the merits of its regulatory products such 
as Basel III.  
 
2. Securities Network 
 
The G20 makes use of IOSCO, a broad and active network of 
securities regulators.200 It develops and promotes “consistent standards of 
regulation, oversight and enforcement in order to protect investors, maintain 
                                                 
200
 See International Organization of Securities Commissions, http://www.iosco.org 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2011). Currently IOSCO has 199 members: 114 ordinary members, 11 
associate members, and 74 affiliate members. IOSCO: Membership and Committees List, 
http://www.iosco.org/lists/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). It has three categories of 
membership: ordinary, associate, and affiliate. See id. Ordinary membership is open to 
primary national securities regulators. About IOSCO: Membership Categories and Criteria, 
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=membership (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). As 
ordinary members, national securities regulators each have one vote in the Presidents 
Committee’s Annual Conference. Id.  Associate members are other securities and or futures 
regulators in a jurisdiction. Id. Associate members have no vote and are not eligible for the 
Executive Committee; however, they are members of the Presidents’ Committee. Id. 
Affiliate members are self-regulatory bodies, which are not members of President’s 
Committee, without a vote or eligibility for the Executive Committee. Id. 
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fair, efficient and transparent markets, and seek to address systemic 
risks.”201 It operates through several committees, the most important of 
which is the Technical Committee.202   
Over the years IOSCO has developed a number of important 
standards and best practices: accounting standards;203 core standards to 
facilitate cross-border offerings and listings;204 global investment 
performance standards;205 auditing standards;206 disclosure standards to 
facilitate cross-border offerings and listings by multinational issuers;207 and 
international standards for central counterparty clearing organizations.208 
These standards and best practices are widely adopted by the leading 
financial regulators and, as a result, followed by transnational firms.209  
IOSCO’s engagement with the G20’s crisis management began with 
IOSCO sending an open letter to the G20, applauding its efforts to deal with 
the crisis and offering assistance.210 Its Technical Committee created a task 
force to support the G20’s efforts.211  It undertook a number of tasks in 
                                                 
201 About IOSCO: General Information, http://www.iosco.org/about (last visited Jan. 
10, 2011). 
202 The Technical Committee’s work covers Multinational Disclosure and Accounting, 
Regulation of Secondary Markets, Regulation of Market Intermediaries, Enforcement and 
the Exchange of Information, Investment Management, and Credit Rating Agencies. About 
IOSCO: Working Committees, 
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=workingcmts (last visited Jul. 17, 2011). 
203 Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Technical Committee Statement on Accounting 
Standards Development and Enforcement (Oct. 21, 2008) (available at 
http://www.iasplus.com/iosco/0810techcommittee.pdf). 
204 TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SECURITIES COMM’NS, IASC 
STANDARDS: ASSESSMENT REPORT 4 (2000), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD109.pdf. 
205 EMERGING MARKETS COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, 
PERFORMANCE PRESENTATION STANDARDS FOR COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES 2 
(Dec. 2000), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD114.pdf. 
206 Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Statement on International Auditing Standards 
(Nov. 9, 2007), (available at http://www.iasplus.com/iosco/0711isastatement.pdf). 
207 INT’L ORG. OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, A RESOLUTION OF THE PRESIDENTS’ 
COMMITTEE ON IOSCO ENDORSEMENT OF DISCLOSURE STANDARDS TO FACILITATE 
CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS AND LISTINGS BY MULTINATIONAL ISSUERS  (1998), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES17.pdf. 
208 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 2 (2004), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD176.pdf. 
209 Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Publishes Regulatory Standards for Funds of Hedge 
Funds (Sept. 14, 2009) (available at 
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS166.pdf). 
210 Open Letter to the G20, 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD282.pdf (last visited Jul. 21, 2011).  
211 Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Technical Committee Launches Task Force to 
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connection with the G20’s efforts including its collaboration with the BCBS 
and the IAIS as part of a Joint Forum resulting in the report on the 
Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation.212      
Most illustrative for our purposes though is IOSCO’s engagement in 
the regulation of “credit rating agencies (CRAs),” both before and during 
the 2008 financial crisis, which  reveals  the use of intra-network dynamics 
over a period of time.  IOSCO’s focus on CRAs emerged after the East 
Asian Financial Crisis and again after the failures of WorldCom and Enron 
in 2002.  While a high credit rating never meant that something was a good 
investment (ratings indicate only “the likelihood that a particular debt 
security will perform according to its terms”),213  the extent to which 
regulators such as the SEC or the Banking network in Basel II referenced 
credit ratings tended to infuse them with credibility.214   As is widely known 
now, this veneer of credibility created problems because there were real 
gaps in CRAs regulation long before the most recent crisis.215   
The IOSCO Technical Committee targeted the CRA gap starting in 
                                                                                                                            
Support G-20 Aims (Nov. 25, 2008) (available at 
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS134.pdf). 
212 Containing core principles as well as cross sectoral standards to avoid systemic risk 
and regulatory arbitrage.  PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, 
at ¶63. The report focused on underwriting standards as well as hedge fund activities. Each 
of the networks involved, including IOSCO were tasked with developing principles to 
respond to regulatory deficits while the FSB oversaw policy implementation. IOSCO for 
example in June 2010 issued its “revised Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
to incorporate eight new principles.” PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra 
note 190, at ¶¶63 The resulting report illustrates the long-standing collaboration of IOSCO 
with Basel Committee as well as the IAIS over many years. The report relied on numerous 
prior reports and studies including Supervision of Financial Conglomerates (February 
1999), Core Principles: Cross-sectoral Comparison (November 2001), Risk Management 
Practices and Regulatory Capital: Cross-sectoral Comparison (November 2001), Credit 
Risk Transfer (March 2005), Regulatory and Market Differences: Issues and Observations 
(May 2006), Customer Suitability in the Retail Sale of Financial Products and Services 
(April 2008), Credit Risk Transfer: Developments from 2005 to 2007 (July 2008), 
Stocktaking on the Use of Credit Ratings (June 2009), and Report on Special Purposes 
Entities (September 2009).   The conclusions and recommendations are based upon this 
prior work of each of the networks working independently as well as the three working 
together through the Joint Forum.   
213 Karmel & Kelly, supra note 78, at 924–25; see also STANDARD & POOR’S, GUIDE 
TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS 3–4 (2010), 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf.  
214 Karmel & Kelly, supra note 78, at 925. 
215 See, e.g., id. at 925 (“The failure of the CRAs to promptly adjust ratings or forecast 
the demise of issuers that went bankrupt when the stock market technology bubble burst 
then led to scrutiny of their performance and the lack of government regulation.”). 
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2003 with a Report of the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies. 216   IOSCO 
also published a set of Principles Regarding the Activities of CRAs in 2003. 
217 But critics questioned the sufficiency of these principles to address 
CRAs problems stemming from Basel II’s use of the ratings. 218 IOSCO 
responded with a Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs offering greater 
specificity with respect to such issues as conflicts of interest, independence, 
and transparency. 219  Interestingly, the rating agencies themselves got into 
the act, developing their own Code of Professional Conduct in the second 
half of 2005.  Indeed, IOSCO’s March 2009 Report Assessing CRAs found 
that many of them had adopted Codes of Conduct that reflected IOSCO’s 
Code of Conduct Fundamentals.220  
Prior to the most recent crisis, the United States Congress addressed 
perceived deficiencies in the CRA system in 2006. Following the IOSCO’s 
Code of Conduct for CRAs, Congress passed the Credit Agency Reform 
Act of 2006 “which established a system of registration and regulation of 
[CRAs] and instructed the SEC to formulate implementing rules.” 221  
Among other things this act established a system of non-mandatory 
registration and imposed substantive requirements with respect to conflicts 
of interest, public information and anticompetitive practices. 222  The SEC 
passed implementing rules. Among other things the rules “prohibit credit 
raters from rating their own work, and ban employees who help determine a 
credit rating from negotiating any fees.” 223 
Although IOSCO’s CRA prototype had hardened into law in the US, 
IOSCO continued elaborating its standards.  It updated its Code of Conduct 
                                                 
216 THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, REPORT ON 
THE ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2003), 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20030930/05.pdf. 
217 THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, IOSCO 
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
(2003), http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20030930/02.pdf. 
218 Karmel & Kelly, supra note 78, at 927. 
219 THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, CODE OF 
CONDUCT FUNDAMENTAL FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2004, revised May 2008), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf. 
220 PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, at ¶¶ 97.   [?] 
221 Kelly & Karmel, supra note 78, at 927. See also Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
of 2006, 109 P.L. 291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 
(2010)). 
222 Global Legal Information Network, Credit Agency Reform Act of 2006, 
http://www.glin.gov/view.action?glinID=190699 (last visited June 12, 2011) (summarizing 
the Act, including registration system and requirements). 
223 EU Lawmakers Back Strict Rules on Credit Agencies, EURACTIV.COM, Mar. 25, 
2009, http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/eu-lawmakers-back-strict-rules-credit-
agencies/article-180606. 
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and issued a Consultation Report. 224 But critics persisted.  In 2008, EU 
Commissioner Charles McCreevy called IOSCO’s efforts toothless. 225   
The EU pushed for and developed stricter standards for the regulation of 
CRAs, the strictest of any jurisdiction. 226  The EU Parliament initially put 
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”) at the center of 
a CRA registration system that included monitoring and implementation.   
The substantive provisions called for a review of business models and a 
decrease in the use of ratings by regulators. 227  The US balked at the 
extraterritorial application of the EU regulations.228   
Once the 2008 crisis emerged we saw the G20 attempt to coordinate 
regulatory outcomes.  Starting with the very first summit, the G20 called 
upon national regulators to improve CRA oversight.  Previously, the US had 
pressed for greater cooperation, while the EU seemed committed to tougher 
regulation.229 The G20, through the FSB, has asked the U.S. and EU to 
resolve significant inconsistencies among their CRA regulations. 230  The 
FSB also urged G20 countries to reduce the use of ratings as the dominant 
                                                 
224 See THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, FINAL 
REPORT: THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS 
(2008), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf. 
225 Gillian Tett, Unease as Regulators Call for More Control Over Ratings System, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, June 25, 2008, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c0ee5928-424e-11dd-
a5e8-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1RMNi2Bxi.  It has been suggested that the EU wanted to 
break the dominance of the US credit rating agencies.  Jim Brunsden, Commission Plans to 
Get Tough With Rating Agencies, EUROPEANVOICE.COM, June 3, 2010, 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/06/commission-plans-to-get-tough-with-
rating-agencies/68104.aspx. 
226 Douglas W. Arner et al., Central Banks and Central Bank Cooperation in the 
Global Financial System, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 380 (2010); 
see also Reforming the Ratings Agencies: Will the U.S. Follow Europe’s Tougher Rules?, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, May 27, 2009, 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2242. 
227 The rules further provide the CRAs: 
“•May not provide advisory services.  
•Must disclose the models, methodologies and key assumptions upon which 
ratings are based.  
•Must differentiate the ratings of complex products with a specific symbol.  
•Must publish an annual transparency report.  
•Must have at least two directors on their boards whose salary does not 
depend on the ratings agency's business performance.  
•Must create an internal function to review the quality of their ratings.” Id. 
228 EU Lawmakers Back Strict Rules on Credit Agencies, supra note _.  
229 Kristina St. Charles, Note, Regulating Imperialism: The Worldwide Export of 
European Regulatory Principles on Credit Rating Agencies, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 399 
(2010) (discussing EU’s stricter CRA regulations and the differences from US regulations). 
230 PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, at ¶¶ 93–95. 
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means of assessing risk.  Adhering to the FSB’s call, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act eliminated references to credit 
ratings in several statutes and the EU is considering similar measures.231 As 
a related matter, the BCBS has also been asked to address reducing the “use 
of external ratings in the regulatory capital framework.”232  Likewise, the 
FSB manages data of for the use of ratings with an eye towards developing 
principles to minimize their use. 233 The FSB committed itself to 
harmonizing CRA regulatory standards in this area.234   
Throughout the crisis, the G20’s coordinated work on CRAs 
continued. It reiterated its calls for improved regulatory oversight at the 
London, Pittsburg and Toronto Summits.235  At the Seoul Summit the G20 
approved Basel III’s recommendation to reduce reliance on CRAs.236  
IOSCO responded to this G20 goal with its May 2010 Principles Regarding 
Cross-border Supervisory Cooperation,237  IOSCO has monitored CRAs 
adoption of codes of conduct consistent with IOSCO’s Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for CRAs, finding that more CRAs are adopting the IOSCO 
standards.238  IOSCO is also monitoring the supervisory initiative of various 
jurisdictions in light of IOSCO CRA Principles. 239 
Despite the G20 coordination, the network dynamics seem to have 
had limited success in moving the key players towards regulatory 
convergence.  Some convergence has occurred. CRAs were originally 
unregulated.240  The US started to move towards regulation after Enron in 
2002 culminating in the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act.241  In the 
                                                 
231 Id. See also Kevin Drawbaugh, Global Regulators Urge Credit Rating Agency 
available at Curbs, REUTERS, Oct. 27, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/28/financial-regulation-credit-raters-
idCNN2728165520101028. 
232 PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, at ¶¶ 93–95. 
233 Id. 
234 Arner et al., supra note 226, at 40. 
235 See id. (discussing G20 and Washington Action Plan). 
236 Nagesh Narayana, G20 Agrees on Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/80745/20101111/basel-3-cra-bis-
ratings.htm. 
237 PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, at ¶ 46. 
238 Id. at 93–95. 
239 Id. 
240 Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004) 
(explaining that the designation of a CRA by the SEC for example (though the use of a no 
action letter) merely meant that the CRA or Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization (NRSRO) was one that was accepted by the market place as a “recognized 
rating agency). 
241 Id. (explaining the rules centered around disclosure and prohibited the SEC from 
regulating the substance of the CRA’s ratings. The SEC followed up with rules focusing on 
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EU, CRAs were likewise unregulated at first.  In 2008, the EU decided to 
take a tough approach to CRA regulation, tougher then both IOSCO and the 
US. Therefore, one might observe that even before the onset of the financial 
crisis the expert community saw the necessity of regulating CRAs.  
However, the resulting mixture of EU, US, and IOSCO regulatory standards 
betrays scarcity of the intra-network dynamics, in particular vis-à-vis the 
Banking Network, as well as the difficulty of executive coordination by the 
G20.   
The problem of conflicts of interests, which plagues the industry, is 
a case in point.  Serious conflicts arose in the industry because issuers chose 
and paid the CRAs they used.  A CRA that wanted business would be better 
off if it tended to give favorable ratings.  Initially, this was not a big 
problem.  As each CRA had an interest in preserving its professional 
reputation, it would not be advantageous for a CRA to risk its reputation 
when there was a sufficient supply of potential customers (issuers) in the 
market.242  Unfortunately, when it came to mortgage-related structured 
bonds, there were not as many issuers, and therefore there was the increased 
threat of conflicts.243   All regulatory bodies recognize conflicts of interest 
as a problem.  The expert community has been persuaded by common 
experience and understanding that there needs to be some external force that 
counteracts this inherent conflict.  However, as each jurisdiction is 
developing its own course, intra-network dynamics, such as persuasion, 
negotiation, responsive engagement and even strategic cooptation, appear to 
be absent for the time being.   
For example, the US regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act seems 
weak when compared to EU efforts.  While the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits 
CRAs from considering sales and marketing when arriving at its rating, it 
does little else to confront conflicts risks.244 Instead, it calls for a two year 
study to determine the feasibility of having another entity assign structured 
finance projects.245  In contrast, the EU approach requires that an issuer not 
only supply information to the CRA it chooses so that the CRA can provide 
the rating, the issuer must also make that information available to all CRAs, 
allowing other CRAs to rate and thus creating competition.246  Another 
issue affecting conflicts of interest involves providing consultancy or 
                                                                                                                            
record keeping reports and procedures. Following some criticism the SEC amended its rule 
to address transparency and conflicts of interests issues). 
242 Regulating Wall Street, supra note 181, at 448.  
243 Id. at 448–449. 
244 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111–203 §§ 
932–933, 124 Stat. 1376, 1883–84 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78o–7, 78u–4(b)(2)). 
245 See id. § 939. 
246 Regulating Wall Street, supra note 181, at 460 (explaining EU regulation).  
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advisory services to a rated entity or its affiliate.  The EU prohibits the 
provision of such services. 247   As one commentator notes, this EU 
provision resembles the requirements of IOSCO’s Code of Conduct. 248  Yet 
the US has failed to adopt this type of provision in its 2006 legislation. 249  
While the Dodd-Frank legislation did address the issue, it simply ordered 
Congress to study the issue, rather than prohibited the practice itself. 250   
Notably, the G20 has not given up on the matter.  Its July 2010 
Progress report notes that the “at the request of the FSB, the EU, US and 
Japan are continuing their discussions to resolve any significant 
inconsistencies or frictions that may arise as a result of differences among 
their new CRA regulations.251  At Seoul the Leaders did approve Basel III 
recommendation on reducing reliance on CRAs, but implementation 
remains with national jurisdictions.252  
In sum, the Securities Network demonstrates a limited success, as 
measured in terms of regulatory convergence, of the G20’s coordination.  
While the G20 did succeed in establishing a regulatory prototype calling for 
its members to duly regulate CRAs and minimize their reliance to CRAs, 
the level of national implementations has not been uniform. Notably, the 
relative scarcity of intra-network dynamics in this area, vis-à-vis the 
Banking Network, may explain the current transatlantic gap in regulating 
CRAs, such as in the area of conflicts of interest.  
 
3. The Insurance Network 
 
 The Insurance Network resides in the IAIS, which brings together 
insurance regulators and supervisors from over 140 countries.253  The IAIS 
develops best practices and core principles for insurance supervisions.254  
Established in 1994 as a forum to develop international insurance norms,255  
                                                 
247 St. Charles, supra note 229, at 433 (citing Council Regulation 1060/2009,  annex I, 
§ B(4)). 
248 Id. at 433 (citing IOSCO, Revised Code of Conduct,  § 2.5). 
249 Id. (citing Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4, 
120 Stat. 1327 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2)).). 
250 Dodd-Frank, supra note 244, § 939C(b).  
251 PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVIOUS SUMMITS, supra note 190, at ¶ 94. 
252 See FIN. STABILITY BOARD, PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCING RELIANCE ON CRA 
RATINGS, (2010) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101027.pdf. 
253 International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Principles, 
http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=39 (last visited Jul. 17, 2011). 
254 Id. 
255 Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for Insurance 
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953, 957 (2009).   
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the IAIS is composed of 190 members from 140 countries.256   The 
Executive Committee, the governing body of the organization, is composed 
of 15 representatives from different geographical regions.257  The IAIS is 
divided into three committees:  a Technical Committee, an Implementation 
Committee, and a Budget Committee.258 Under the Technical Committee 
are various working parties responsible with drafting IAIS standards.259     
The IAIS papers are intended to be implemented “in a flexible manner 
depending on the circumstances within each jurisdiction.”260 The 
Implementation Committee assists members by organizing training and 
seminars, developing implementation tools, facilitating the provision of 
technical assistance, and supporting the Financial Sector Assessment 
Programme conducted by the IMF and World Bank.261  
 The G20 Leaders have looked to the IAIS with respect to several 
issues.  It has tapped the IAIS in its efforts to coordinate capital adequacy 
standards.262  In response to the G20’s request in 2009 it adopted a 
supervisory guidance paper on the use of supervisory colleges.  It has also 
adopted the Insurance Core Principles Review Process.263  As stated above, 
it coordinated with the BCBS and IOSCO as part of the Joint Forum. As 
stated about the IAIS collaboration with the BCBS and IOSCO in the Joint 
                                                 
256 The NAIC and an insurance regulator from each of the fifty-six US jurisdiction 
serve as members.  International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), About the 
IAIS, http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=28 (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).  See also 
Brown, supra note 255, at 963.  
257About the IAIS, supra note 256.  Yoshi Kawai, Secretary General, IAIS, Remarks at 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs:  IAIS Standards Setting Activities 10 (Feb. 3, 
2004) (available at 
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/IAIS_standard_setting_activities__Speech_by_Yoshihiro_
Kawai.pdf). 
258 INT’L ASS’N. OF INS. SUPERVISORS (IAIS), BY-LAWS art. 15(3) (2009), 
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/By-laws__2009_edition_.pdf. 
259 Kawai, supra note 257, at 10. After a working party drafts a document, it consults 
with other IAIS members and observers, and then seeks approval from the Technical 
Committee and endorsement from the Executive Committee.  Id. The draft is finally 
presented at an annual General Meeting where it must be approved by two-thirds of the 
members. Id. 
260
 IAIS, Overarching Standard Setting Papers, 
http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=37 (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
261 Kawai, supra note 257, at 10 
262 WASHINGTON ACTION PLAN, supra note 179, at ¶ 16. “The IAIS is working to 
assess issues that have emerged from the financial crisis with respect to the assessment of 
the solvency of insurance companies and the group-wide solvency requirements for 
internationally active insurance groups. 
263 INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS: INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLES AND 
METHODOLOGY (2003), 
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Insurance_core_principles_and_methodology.pdf. 
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Forum preceded the 2008 financial crisis and the reports that followed the 
crisis built upon that prior work.264  
Finally, in response to the financial crisis and urging from the G20, 
the IAIS is now “developing group-wide supervisory standards for all 
insurance groups and a Common Framework for the Supervision of 
Internationally Active Insurance Groups (“ComFrame”).
265
   A task force 
chaired by a member of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority 
(FINMA) designed a work plan meant to provide qualitative and 
quantitative requirements that would assist in monitoring group structures, 
group business mixes and intra group transactions. 266  In January, 2010, the 
Executive Committee approved the recommendations on the design and 
work plan of the framework. 267 The Executive Committee will implement 
the plan, by first starting with a consultative paper in 2011 followed by 
implementation in 2013. 268   
In the Insurance Network, as in other Networks, network dynamics 
complicate the G20’s coordination efforts. The IAIS efforts, and in 
particular its efforts in connection with the ComFrame has spurred US 
regulatory efforts.269  ComFrame addresses holding company capital 
adequacy, an issue already addressed by the EU in its regulations of insurers 
270  through its Solvency II directive.  Solvency II establishes a risk-based 
regulatory regime,271  sets new capital adequacy and risk management 
                                                 
264 See Bank for International Settlements: Joint Forum, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/jointforum.htm (last visited June 12, 2011). See also International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors: Joint Forum, http://www.iaisweb.org/Joint-Forum-
49 (last visited June 12, 2011) (showcasing the reports created by the Joint Forum). 
265 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY 5 (2010), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100627c.pdf [hereinafter 
STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY]. 
266 Id. 
267 See Press Release, IAIS, IAIS Improves Development of a Common Framework for 




268 STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 265, at 5. 
269 Tom Finnell, Invotex Group, Assessing the Solvency of U.S. Insurance Groups—
International Pressures Mount, http://www.invotex.com/perspectives_1010.html (last 
visited Jul. 17, 2011). 
270 As one commentator notes “ConFrame is poised to include requirements for 
quantitative assessments by regulators of group capital.” Id. 
271 Nikki Tait, EU Insurers Face Solvency II Deadlines, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011,  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/36960460-23e2-11e0-8bb1-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1Cum99eQO. 
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standards, and “aims to change investment behaviour by imposing varying 
capital charges on assets.”272   A real fear exists as to whether US efforts 
would pass an EU equivalency test with Solvency II. 273   US industry feels 
that the EU system is too costly.274    Working through the IAIS, as well as 
the EU, the US is attempting to influence the standards.  Working through 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, US insurers have 
tried to become part of a provisional regime which, at least for some time 
will be treated as “equivalent” with the EU’s Solvency II. 275   
All in all, there is wide disagreement between the EU and US 
approaches, which undermines some intra-network dynamics such as 
persuasion and negotiation.   The back and forth between the US and EU 
takes place at the same time that the IMF as instructed by the G20 is 
implementing its MAP program which assesses the stability of each 
country’s financial architecture including the capital adequacy standards for 
insurers.276 The dynamics in this area largely remain to be seen and it will 
be interesting to note how the G20’s push for the IMP to implement the 
MAP influences the dynamics between the EU and the US as well as other 
key players.    
 
4. The Trade Network 
 
It is controversial whether there exists a genuine trade network that 
functions at the G20 level. As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 
tapped the WTO along with the OECD and UNCTAD to monitor and report 
on the trade and investment measures amongst the G20 countries.277  They 
generated several reports detailing the types and impact of various trade and 
investment measures.  Aside from being tasked with a reporting function 
that was already being undertaken in some respects by the WTO, the trade 
                                                 
272 Steve Johnson, Insurers Gear up for New Charges, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b9bb046-2b10-11e0-a65f-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1Cum99eQO. Equities will need to be backed by reserves of 30-
40 per cent, while European sovereign debt is deemed risk free.” Id. 
273 Finnell, supra note 269. 
274 Id. 
275 DELOITTE, IAIS ANNUAL UPDATE: ANNUAL MEETING 2 (2010) 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/FSI/US_FSI_IAISUpdate_120910.pdf. 
276 Factsheet, The G20 Mutual Assessment Process 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm (July 27,2010). 
277Press Release, OECD, WTO and UNCTAD renew calls to G20 to resist 
protectionism, (Aug. 3, 2010) (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34529562_44741628_1_1_1_1,00.htm
l). 
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network has not been linked into the ongoing efforts of the G20.  To be fair 
the very preparation of these reports can be said to have restrained countries 
enacting taking protectionist measures.  But its participation has been 
somewhat marginalized as the G20 progress reports and Leaders Summit 
declarations reveal.  While there is language calling for the conclusion of 
the Doha Round and the need to resist protectionist tendencies, the WTO, 
OECD and UNCTAD joint reports emit a sense of frustration that the G20 
has not pushed for more on the trade front.  Given the highly 
plenipotentiary nature of trade officials prone to the domestic politics, it 
would be difficult to claim that the Trade Network exists in the G20 as an 
independent network.   
 
 
 IV. EVALUATING THE G20’S COORDINATION  
 
Having identified a model of new global governance in the G20 
coordination of multiple TRNs, the next step would be to evaluate the 
model. One might conceive two basic criteria for this purpose. First, does it 
work? Critics often point to the tedious process of G20 operation, in 
particular after the initial success in coordinating anti-crisis measures.278 
Some critics simply question the empirical foundation of a “success.”279 
Others consider such lack of satisfying progress as a “structural” dilemma 
inherent in the nature of a network.280 Second, is it legitimate?  We would 
break this second question into sub-questions: is it accountable, equitable 
and appropriately representative? The G20’s invisible nature raises 
transparency and accountability questions. Also, now that most of network 
operations are undeniably dominated by the Western developed countries, 
poor countries’ concern for any possible alienation, marginalization and 
even exploitation should not be readily dismissed.281  Finally, even though 
                                                 
278 
See, e,g., Marina Larionova, Assessing G8 and G20 Effectiveness in Global 
Governance So Far, 31 INT’L ORG. RES. J. 99 (2010) (noting that there is information 
questioning G20 success as an ant-crisis management mechanism). 
279 
See Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global 
Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1277-78 
(2005) (reviewing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004)). 
280 
See Verdier, supra note 7, at 166. See also Heather Stewart and Larry Elliott, Hopes 
Fading for Salvation at the Summit, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 22, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/22/g20-global-economy1 (noting that some 
critics doubt if the diversity of the G20 can come to any agreement whatsoever). 
281 Interestingly, these criteria themselves might conflict each other. For example, 
scholars often attribute the initial success of G20 in tackling the financial crisis to the 
smallness of its membership that facilitated an agile decision-making process, which in 
turn could be translated into effectiveness. At the same time, however, a number of non-
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TRNs may claim legitimacy based on expertise, TRN insularity raises 
concerns given their influence in a pluralistic world.    
 
A.  The Effectiveness of G20 Operation  
 
Assessing the G20’s efficacy requires an assessment of the coordinated 
network structure generally and also an inquiry into whether the G20 has in 
particular accomplished what it has set out to do.  Unsurprisingly, neither 
inquiry will be free from debate.  As Alexandroff and Kirton point out, the 
experts disagree as to whether the G20 structure will be an effective one. 
Some see it as a step backward away from rules based multilateralism, or as 
an outright failure, while others see it as a strong start to creating a much 
needed global governance regime.282 Looking more particularly at the tasks 
that the G20 has set out for itself and its success in accomplishing those 
tasks, the response has been varied as well.283 
 First, it is vital to recognize that the effectiveness of G20 operation 
depends largely on that of the TRN itself as a regulatory engine. In this 
regard, the verdict on the efficacy of the TRN among scholars is a mixed 
one. Anne-Marie Slaughter argues a government network is the “real new 
world order,”284 and “the blueprint for the international architecture of the 
21st century.”285 Kal Raustiala even argues that government networks could 
                                                                                                                            
members, in particular developing countries, criticize its exclusive membership that keeps 
those countries at the margin of global decision-making process. 
282 See Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 95, at 177–178. 
283 IVAN SAVIC & NICK ROUDEV, G20 RES. GROUP, PROGRESS ON G20 FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY COMMITMENTS FROM WASHINGTON 2008 UNTIL TORONTO 2010 (2010) 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/g20finregs.html.  
284 SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 183, 197. Perhaps one should not bundle all networks 
together in one category for the purpose of evaluation. Each network addresses a different 
problem, although there might be some functional overlapping among these three kinds. Id. 
Therefore, a different type of network should be subject to a different criterion for its 
effectiveness. In this regards, Slaughter’s three categories of government networks, 
depending on their major functions (goals) in networking may help. According to 
Slaughter, there are three different types of network: “information networks” which not 
only exchange regulatory views but also filter information on regulatory standards; 
“enforcement networks” which facilitates individual and collective enforcement of network 
norms; “harmonization networks” in which regulatory standards converge. Id. at 167–68. 
In this sense, the G20 might be said to meet all these three criteria since it facilitates all the 
regulatory dialogues among government officials (information network), creates regulatory 
prototypes (harmonization network), and even commits itself to adopt and implement those 
prototypes subject to peer review (enforcement network). Here, Slaughter uses the term 
“networks” as referring to relatively loose, cooperative arrangements across borders 
between and among like agencies that seek to respond to global issues. Id. at 14. 
285 Id. 
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complement treaties by facilitating their operation or smoothing their 
negotiation or even supplement them by conducting certain gap-filling 
functions.286 However, Kenneth Anderson points out, rightly, the difficulty 
involved in evaluating its worthiness i.e., “whether these government 
networks are actually solving problems or merely talking about 
problems.”287  
Skeptics challenge the eventual effectiveness, and thus the very 
rationale, of a TRN. Their skepticism is two-fold: empirical and structural. 
First, skeptics may contend that the G20 case study suffers a selection bias. 
They may argue that its alleged success hinges mostly on its subject-matter 
(“finance”), rather than on the network operation itself. In other words, they 
contend that the network theory would not work well in more sensitive 
areas such as arms control or nuclear non-proliferation.288  Likewise, 
skeptics might point out the lack of empirical confirmations on the political 
cross-bargain between certain regulatory subjects.  In theory, one might 
reasonably speculate that the U.S. might cede to the EU’s penchants for 
stricter CRA regulation in exchange for the latter’s adoption of a modified 
version of the Volker rule.289 
 Admittedly, the subject-matter of networking is critical for its 
potential success. As seen in the government networks addressing the Y2K 
problem, those issues around which networkers share strongly converging 
interests are more readily prone to a coordinated response from networkers 
than other issues.290 And while the G20 may claim success in addressing the 
financial crisis,291 it has not been able to agree on the post-crisis measures, 
in particular the global imbalances. These issues appear to be analogous to 
those related to “vital national security interests” or those “touching on 
issues of high domestic political sensitivity.”292 Therefore, the issue-
specificity matters in determining the overall success of G20 operation, 
though it might not be the sole factor.293 
 Perhaps a more difficult question might be how to define a success 
or failure. This question is basically an “empirical” one. If one focuses 
                                                 
286 Raustiala, supra note 19, at 6. 
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solely on end products from the G20 coordination, there might be a plenty 
of proofs for its success, as long as an evaluator fully appreciates an 
incremental nature of such norm-making process and thus inevitably soft 
attributes of these prototypes. Yet if one ascribes its success to any real life 
regulatory changes in people’s behaviors, not merely the existence of 
newly-crafted multiple regulatory standards, we might have to wait for 
some time before we render any definite judgment. Indeed, what might at 
first seem a success, can be proven later to be a failure.294 Likewise, one 
might argue that those new standards would have materialized any way 
from national, not necessarily global, initiatives.  In such case, the G20 
would have played a rather modest role.   
 In contrast, some scholars pin their skepticism in the very structure 
of TRNs. They question the power of the bond or socialization among 
networkers. They basically view that networkers as government officials, 
tend to serve and be controlled by their domestic constituencies, rather than 
loyal to a “hypothetical global polity” such as a government network.295 In 
this context, Kenneth Anderson observes that: 
 
[Government officials] are primarily fiduciaries acting on behalf 
of others whose values they represent, not seekers of reason or the 
truth as such, and they are not free to ignore the constituents they 
represent and to depart on their own searches for truth with their 
fellow truth-seekers in an international forum.296 
 
Skeptics also argue that without any formal bargains TRNs cannot 
effectively handle distributive consequences, such as costs and benefits, of 
adopting a certain standard which might negatively or positively affect each 
state.297 Moreover, they argue that networks alone cannot secure 
                                                 
294 See Jeffery Atik, Basel II: A Post Mortem, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
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enforcement of those standards once they are adopted.298 Finally, skeptics 
predict that networkers are forced to defect from previously established 
standards if domestic lobbies pressure those networkers.299 
 Unlike the empirical critique, however, these structural attacks 
against the effectiveness of government networks betray some “realist” 
assumptions. They nearly equate global governance with the world 
government. As long as we live in an anarchy, all treaties, even if they are 
technically binding, are basically vague any way and unenforceable in the 
domestic sense in many occasions. In other words, international cooperation 
– formal and informal – may not bring forth any immediate compliance 
which can be secured by direct remedies in the domestic sense. Also in our 
view, the structural critique is over-consequentialist. Insofar as realists are 
readily inclined to dismiss the effectiveness of government network based 
on the lack of domestic enforcement mechanisms, they largely lose sight of 
the value microscopic networking processes. We would argue that the 
realist world is too simplistic: realists are blinded by their fidelity to 
enforcement. Simply, there are more dynamics going on within the TRN 
than realists conceive.   
True, networkers as regulators are subject to various domestic 
checks and pressures from not only their governments but also the media 
and the public. Yet they are not “masterless ronin”300 or mere mechanical 
tools of their government. They also “shape” their governments’ policies. 
Most of them are not political appointees. On the contrary, many are career 
officials who sit on the same issue area for decades. Even politicians cannot 
ignore their judgments. Likewise, skeptics assume that the domestic power 
dynamics on a given regulatory issue is always linear and domestic 
constituencies’ preferences unitary. The reality is far more complicated. 
There is simply more room for regulators, as norm-sponsors, to advocate 
and internalize network standards which enjoy professional (expert) 
legitimacy. 301 
More importantly, the soft nature of standards recommends them 
because they will be reviewed by national regulators prior to 
implementation.  As seen in the example of EU Directives, it is up to each 
domestic jurisdiction how to implement the network standards, more 
precisely how to “fine-tune” them in accordance with its domestic legal 
system. In addition, a TRN can have a monitoring/surveillance mechanism, 
as seen in the G20 Progress Report, thereby securing opportunities for self-
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correction via feedback. Finally, the G20, as the Leaders’ Summit, itself 
holds some ability to encourage compliance.   
 In sum, the empirical line of critique on TRNs has a point in that this 
new model of global governance still needs to be further vetted. 
Nonetheless, insofar as the G20 has succeeded to generate various 
frameworks and regulatory prototypes, its operation could be called a 
success.    
While the ability of the G20 to generate prototypes can be used to 
proclaim the G20 a success, before doing so we should critique whether 
these are at least the prototypes called for by the circumstances.  In other 
words, did the G20 do what it had intended to do?  The Washington Action 
Plan speaks in broad terms of “effectively regulated financial markets”302 
but it also sets some more specific tasks for itself including reinforcing 
international cooperation, reforming international financial institutions and 
even more specific goals such as exercising strong oversight over credit 
rating agencies.303   We believe that the G20 set for itself a primary goal of 
developing an architecture to coordinate the workings of the various TRNs 
to combat the crisis and that it was successful in doing so.      
The construction of the architecture had several key components. 
Early on leaders worked out the structure and role of the Financial Stability 
Forum transforming it into the FSB.304   During the Washington Summit 
FSF Chair Mario Draghi and IMF Managing Director Strauss-Kahn 
resolved their disagreement about the role and relationship of their 
respective institutions to the new global financial architecture. The two 
agreed that a lightly institutionalized FSF would set new standards, but the 
organizationally powerful IMF would then monitor and enforce compliance 
with them.”305  The resulting action plan reflected this agreement.306  
The Leaders tapped the Finance Ministers to initiate an “action 
plan” and “timeline.”307 That action plan called upon the resources and 
efforts of the IMF, the FSF, the Finance Ministers, the BCBS, the World 
Bank, the OECD, and the key global accounting standards bodies (IASB 
and FASB, IASCF).308 The G20 “Progress Reports” on its actions plans 
reveal a carefully choreographed response to the crisis.309 The Washington 
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Action Plan for example, asked the FSF to assist private sector bodies as 
well as key global accounting standard setting bodies with strengthening 
transparency and accountability; the FSF and IMF were asked to develop 
“recommendations to mitigate pro-cyclicality”; the BCBS was asked to 
study stress testing models; the OECD was asked to facilitate tax 
information exchange among other things.310  
Interestingly, in some ways the G20, acted somewhat like a mega-
network,311 conducting both a norm-making and a coordinative function. Its 
coordination spurred regulatory prototypes, with swiftly implementable 
guidelines and recommendations, as well as frameworks consisting of long-
term action plans or policy directions to coordinate between and among 
sector-specific regulatory prototypes. 312  In addition, the G20’s unique 
surveillance (peer review) mechanism, such as the MAP,313 under which the 
G20 can collectively evaluate each member’s record of compliance with 
previous blueprints and regulatory prototypes, is yet another sign of 
                                                                                                                            
Trustee of the International Accounting Standard Committee Foundation (IASCF) have 
agreed to establish a formal link to a newly created external Monitoring Board composed 
of public authorities, including chairs of the expanded IOSCO Technical Committee and 
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for geographic diversity”) Id. a 4.   The progress reports are extremely detailed and focus 
on each of the bodies tasked with any duty under the action plans.  
310 WASHINGTON ACTION PLAN, supra note 179, at 1–5. 
311 Such notion of “mega-network” or a horizontal “network of networks” is not new. 
Slaughter locates such a network of networks in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 
formed in 1996 by amalgamating three independent government networks – the Basel 
Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) – in order to addressing those 
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312 Admittedly the leaders (prime ministers or presidents) are not professional 
regulators themselves and probably do not know anything about how the international 
finance is actually operating.  But they offer critical political "glues" which hold those 
individual networks together as well as some aura of legitimacy. As a corollary, the G20 
will move on even if all the current leaders are replaced in the next elections as long as 
those professional regulators still manage the micro-level regulatory networking.  The 
networks that it coordinates have existed for some time and have been strengthen by the 
G20 Leaders coordination.  Alexandroff and Kirton for example describe the actual 
negotiations in the Washington Summit as “going well” stating that there was a 
“substantial degree of personal involvement, passion and even spontaneous discussion 
among the leaders.” Alexandroff & Kirton, supra note 95, at 183. 
313 See Factsheet: The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process, International Monetary Fund, 
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effectiveness in executive coordination.  Importantly, the G20 Leaders 
coordination resulted in part from their shared belief in the needed response 
to the crisis.  Undeniably though despite some shared beliefs the Leaders 
group remains a political grouping subject to typical political pressures 
from diverse constituencies.  
 
B.  Legitimacy Questions: Accountability, Equity, and Representation of the 
G20 Operation  
  
While the ineffectiveness critique of the TRN assumes the lack of 
autonomy of network participants, the legitimacy critique takes a 
diametrically opposite position on the nature of network participants. The 
legitimacy critiques include concerns over accountability, equity, and 
representation.  While we think that the legitimacy critiques have merit we 
believe that they can be ameliorated.  In fact, we hope that our dissection of 
the coordinated network phenomenon aids in that effort.  
Some scholars fear that the disaggregation of a unitary state, which 
forms a foundation of TRNs, would unduly weaken the state authority.314 
They fear that those regulators would acculturate themselves too much with 
the network norms or their ideals in a way which may go against the 
traditional value of state sovereignty or national interest.315 Therefore, they 
suspect that the government network would “tip[] in favor of global 
governance in ways that devalue democracy and democratic 
accountability”316 For example, there is a real question of whether G20 
nations are going to hand over sovereignty to the G20 or any other 
institution to institute changes that might be needed to ameliorate the 
tension between globalization and financial risk.317 
There are responses to these concerns. TRNs are still subject to 
various domestic mechanisms of check and balance. While network 
participants as norm-entrepreneurs internalize network standards by 
creating new domestic legal and political dynamics, these standards are still 
subject to domestic judicial/legislative challenges in a post-internalization 
stage.318 One could even argue that TRNs may enhance accountability by 
providing counterforce against domestic special interests which often 
capture domestic regulators and undermine the public policy.  Nonetheless, 
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the government network’s soft, informal nature may still be a double-edged 
sword. Although it may facilitate interstate cooperation, it may sidestep 
various checks and disciplines secured by a formal mechanism, such as 
administrative or constitutional law, or the concern of transparency and 
democratic accountability.319    Ideally, national lawmakers should be 
attuned to these concerns and not allow the TRN process to foreclose 
national checks and balances.320  
Another potential criticism against the government network is that 
the whole network operation is biased in favor of the powerful developed 
countries.321 The end products of the network, such as regulatory 
prototypes, might already reflect those of the dominant states.322 Based on 
his empirical study on various government networks, Kal Raustiala 
observes that networks tend to impose powerful nations’ regulatory model 
upon less powerful countries since the former dominate in the networking 
process.323 Therefore, the North may be a standard-setter, while the South 
may be a standard-taker.324  
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In this vein, Anne-Marie Slaughter, the chief advocate of TRN, 
herself acknowledges that regulatory convergence toward network norms, 
often pressured by the very dynamics of a network, might be seen as 
illegitimate in a certain domestic political context.325 Stephen Toope even 
argues that “[n]etworks...are sites of power, and potentially of exclusion and 
inequality.”326 Likewise, networks might undermine a traditional space of 
more formal public international law under which less powerful countries 
might receive better protection via sovereign equality.327 
While this power disparity critique holds water in general, particular 
advantages may still exist under certain circumstances for less developed 
members of the network when they adopt pre-made, pre-tested regulatory 
standards of major advanced countries, in particular through a “strategic co-
optation,” discussed above.328 First, such regulatory importation may reduce 
regulatory costs in that importing jurisdictions need not create those 
standards from scratch.329 Second, from the standpoint of less developed 
members adopting the dominant member’s standards tends to accord the 
former’s standards an aura of legitimacy, which in turn encourages more 
members to adopt the dominant standards, such as those of the United 
States.330 Third, as more members within the government network adopt a 
certain (dominant) standard, the utility generated by adopting the standard 
tends to increase. Economists label this phenomenon of self-proliferation of 
dominant standards as the “network effect.”331  Moreover, at least as far as 
the G20 is concerned, the new geography of power embodied in the G20 
membership could mitigate the power disparity concerns to some extent. 
Admittedly, questions still remain as to whether this is the right 
representation, whether there are countries missing, and whether the 
Northern countries have too much influence.332   
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 The use of coordinated networks also raises a host of other 
legitimacy questions.  Representativeness, or input legitimacy,333 seems 
weak because as we know networkers are not elected, they tend to be civil 
servants.  The career regulator status of network participant means that 
network legitimacy is based more on expertise, or output legitimacy,334 than 
on representativeness.  TRNs may be perceived as legitimate because they 
produce good work.335  Of course, what constitutes good work assumes a 
normative position, so even the expertise justification is not perfect.  
Financial regulation impacts environmental efforts,336 labor,337 pensions,338 
health care339 and even food security.340  Specialized career regulators are 
poorly situated to consider the externalities imposed on other issue areas.   
Bank regulators in the banking network come from a common background 
and experience. Their ability to tolerate risk may be different from someone 
who focuses on labor or healthcare or even trade.    However we conceive 
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of legitimacy,341 we need to be able to evaluate to what extent 
unrepresentative or expert institutions reach beyond their expertise to 
account for the values of a pluralistic society.  
 One might claim that it is the coordination of the G20 that 
legitimizes the goals of the TRNs.  We would argue that such a claim would 
need careful examination.   One would have to consider to what extent the 
G20 could (and did) take account of the interests and constituencies affected 
by the TRNs.  Our concern here is not that a political grouping such as the 
G20 could never legitimize the work of the TRNs, simply that we should 
not assume that it does.  Nor should we allow the expert status of the TRNs 
to supply the G20 with a veneer of legitimacy that may be undeserved.  
In addition to the general concerns of representativeness there are 
some specific representativeness concerns that stem from the work that 
TRNs do.  Networkers’ expertise, their insular dealings, and the matters at 
stake, subject them to a unique danger of capture. Most agencies face 
capture by special interests because those special interests have tremendous 
incentives to focus their efforts on persuading the agency to adopt favorable 
positions.342  More dispersed groups that may be affected by the agency 
have less ability to coordinate.343  Capture at the TRN level is especially 
problematic for several reasons.  The networks collect an elite set of 
regulators working, at times, far away in secluded settings.  These 
regulators are already known to industry and in some instances move 
between government work and industry.  These regulators are particularly 
attractive to special interest groups because capturing just one of the 
regulators may allow an interest group a veto over the entire process.344  But 
what is particularly problematic is the influence of different states’ positions 
on any particular proposal.  Suppose that regulator from country A wants a 
rule regulating hedge funds that is fairly strict and enforceable.  Regulator 
from Country B agrees that hedge funds should be regulated but prefers a 
softer approach.  Lobbyist C (working for the hedge fund industry) will not 
only lobby State A to change its position but will also Lobby State B to 
press hard on regulator from State A.  
The fluid and incremental nature of network also calls for a new 
conception of legitimacy.   Networks operate over a period of time.  Their 
tasks change, sometimes at their own insistence.  Our conception of 
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legitimacy must account for the fact that networks may sometimes act as 
semi-autonomous norm generators working over time.345  The combination 
of this incremental work combined with the fact that their end products 
often harden into domestic law, leads to the possibility of a gloss of 
unwarranted legitimacy.346   Further because their work spans decades, they 
invest time, credibility, and capital that creates a certain amount of path 
dependence.  Once a national jurisdiction considers hardening a network 
prototype or recommendation through regulation or legislation there has 
already been considerable buy-in because of the amount of time and 
expertise expanded at the network level.  Thus, there is a real concern 
whether the national checks and balances discussed above will be side 
stepped. We would worry that the incremental process could undermine 
national debate.  Thus, our conception of legitimacy must account for the 
incremental and semi-autonomous operations of networks.  TRNs need to 
manage their legitimacy, proactively, and seek input and processes that 
justify their work over a period of time.  States must ensure that their 
national processes are not short circuited.   
Networks insularity and technical focus also creates a challenge for 
representative legitimacy.  Networks hear from the same voices, in part 
because in order to converse intelligently in their world one must speak the 
technical language they speak.347  One might wish to complement networks’ 
expertise with input legitimacy in the form of additional process or indirect 
representation.    For example transparency can help.  One might perceive 
networks as more legitimate if their proceedings were viewed and 
understood by more people. But transparency has costs as well.  
Transparency can sometimes thwart negotiations.348 And one can never 
assure transparency to all aspect of negotiations.349  Alternatively, opening 
up the network process to members of civil society for example might 
improve process, representation, and transparency, but it is less than a 
perfect solution.  More participation might mean more delays350 or even 
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derailment of regulatory efforts.351  Allowing for more participation does 
not mean it will be forthcoming. Both the BCBS and IOSCO have public 
comment procedures but receive comments almost exclusively from 
industry insiders.  Finally, one should not assume that civil society is itself 
accountable, or representative is all respects.352  The type of process or 
procedure needs to be coordinated as well.  Our conception of legitimacy 
may need to be more contextual. 353  
In sum, while the G20 coordination tends to raise a number of 
accountability and legitimacy concerns, they are not insurmountable. Yet 
the G20 should first acknowledge, not dismiss, the validity of those 
concerns. Then, the G20 should find ways to address each concern focusing 
its unique context. One solution might not serve all occasions. For example, 
measures enhancing transparency, if implemented randomly, might in fact 





Coordinated TRNs herald a new model of global governance that is 
flexible, spontaneous and effective. As seen in the G20 example, the 
coordinated TRN model can deliver prompt regulatory responses to global 
challenges of our time, such as the recent financial crisis. One might 
reasonably speculate that a conventional international response via pure 
diplomacy or treaty-making would not have achieved the same result. As 
the G20 leaders themselves declared with confidence, it “worked.”354 
Nonetheless, this nascent paradigm of global governance has 
attracted various criticisms from different standpoints, such as efficacy and 
legitimacy. As discussed above, some of these criticisms are not without 
merits, while others may be exaggerated.  Certainly we want to consider the 
meritorious concerns. 
First, governments, including the G20 members, should facilitate 
more communications and better networking among like-minded 
networkers (government officials) and between these networkers and 
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international organizations which often offer forums for such networking. 
For this purpose, governments should encourage personnel exchanges and 
hold many policy discussion forums, such as workshops and seminars, so 
that regulators in the same sector from different countries can brainstorm 
and deliberate on areas of their common interest. As Kal Raustiala argues, 
government networks could complement treaties by facilitating their 
operation or smoothing their negotiation or even supplement them by 
conducting certain gap-filling functions.355 In a related vein though 
government should also consider issue areas that these networks affect 
which are beyond their area of expertise and take steps to include voices 
that speak to those issue areas.  Civil society may be able to offer assistance 
in this regard, however, government must be mindful of whether civil 
society participants are themselves legitimate.   
Second, developed countries should offer a genuine, not mere lip-
service, level of development aid to developing countries to boost the 
latter’s human capital. Without serious capacity-building, developing 
countries cannot effectively participate in this networking process. Under 
this situation, any network standard (regulatory prototype) would be hard to 
survive the dominance critique.  
Third, government networks should establish more active, rigorous 
and consistent surveillance mechanisms to increase the overall efficacy of 
their network standards. Without this policy evaluation/feedback process, 
any initial blueprints or regulatory prototypes would soon cease to evolve. 
Importantly, it is the characteristic nature of a government network that a 
network standard should continuously evolve toward a more solid outcome.  
Fourth, government should invest more in social marketing or PR 
over the network phenomenon. For most people, the network phenomenon 
remains esoteric. Insofar as people are ill-informed of this new model of 
global governance, its prospect is not bright. Moreover, government 
networks can anticipate any constructive criticisms from domestic 
constituencies and civil society only when they are well-informed of the 
network phenomenon.  
Finally, the G20 as a mega-network or a network of networks 
embraces unique challenges which may not be shared by other individual 
networks. While a network symbolizes the “disaggregation” of state356 in 
that each network is a sector (issue)-specific and de-centralized 
phenomenon, the G20 “re-aggregates” those multiple networks and project 
a mega-network, which inevitably restores a conventional inter-national 
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representativeness. As long as the G20 holds this plenipotentiary nature, the 
current size of membership will continue to be debated, probably without 
any immediate consensus. Moreover, as the exigency of financial crisis 
eventually ebbs away, the political capital bestowed on the G20 network 
will also decline.357 Under this circumstance, the erstwhile strong 
professional cohesion that bonds various individual networks together may 
disappear. Then, the G20 may degrade into an empty talk shop.  
 To avoid this worst case scenario and preserve the G20 momentum, 
some pundits, including the next G20 Summit host, the French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, propose that a permanent secretary be instituted for the 
G20. Plausible as this proposal may sound in the first place, it also 
generates new dilemmas for the G20. First, the G20, as a mega-network, 
has in fact been successful due to soft institutionalization. Yet with this hard 
institutionalization and consequent augmented bureaucratization, the G20 
may lose its characteristic agility in policy response. Second, this new 
mega-bureaucracy, which may only parallel the UN in its magnitude, may 
invite a familiar foreboding of a World Government among sovereigntists. 
Such foreboding may cost the G20 some reputation (legitimacy) regardless 
of its merits.  
 In conclusion, it is fair to state that the hitherto success of 
government network in general, as well as that of the G2o in particular, may 
not offer a firm guarantee for their future prosperity. Although this new 
model of global governance is salutary, the jury is still out there for a final 
verdict on it. Meanwhile, however, the G20 has enough room to further 
evolve into a better paradigm of global governance.  
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